

**PEACE PLANS AND
AMERICAN CHOICES**

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PEACE PLANS and AMERICAN CHOICES

The Pros and Cons of World Order

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Drawings by John W. Collins



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PREFACE

It is said that, when we fought Germany before, we won the war and lost the peace. Now, we are coming to be doubly resolved, first, to win the war, and, second, to achieve a genuine and enduring peace.

To realize this second aim, numerous peace plans and programs have been put forward. In some cases they are as far apart as the poles. In other cases, they are near together with regard to general principles but differ in other important respects. In many cases, plans for preventing war are discussed along with proposals that have no direct and decisive bearing on this central problem. Labels and catch words are multiplying: "the people's century," "*pax Americana*," "federal union," "an association of free nations," "a league with teeth," "policing the world," "a cooling-off period." Altogether, the average citizen bids fair, even at this early stage of the discussion, to be more confused than enlightened.

How an ordered free world is to be established and maintained will depend largely on the leadership and policy of the United States. Leadership is already ours; the policy is foreshadowed in the declarations of our responsible leaders, but it has yet to take definite form. In a democracy, policy gets its principles and its stamp of validity from public opinion; and, in order to be practical, workable, and lasting, the peace plan must be democratically shaped and securely rooted in the convictions of a substantial popular majority. In order that choices may be made and opinion crystallized, we must

soon undertake a process of *elimination*. All of the relevant plans and issues must be debated widely, with full understanding and consideration of both sides of every controversial question.

The purpose of this book is to boil down the various suggestions and possibilities to about a dozen concrete propositions, to state briefly the essential features of each proposition, and to give in each case, also briefly, arguments for and arguments against. No particular proposal or argument necessarily reflects what the author himself believes. Thus, in purpose, content, and form, this book is quite different from any of the previous publications of the Institution.

From the fact that every proposal is attacked as well as defended the reader should not infer that nothing can be done or should be attempted. Something must be done. Some choice must be made from proposals having the range and nature of those discussed in this book. Whatever plan may be chosen or devised, arguments can and will be made against it. There is no such thing as an unobjectionable way to prevent war. Peace has its price. Risks must be run. Each one of us has the responsibility as a citizen to make up his mind which of these various proposals, singly or in combination, he believes to be the best. The United States *must* adopt a policy.

HAROLD G. MOULTON
President

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

Most of the current plans for durable peace start with the idea that the problem is primarily one of power. In our view also, this is a sound assumption and in this volume we shall deal in the main with ways of applying power for the purpose of maintaining world order.

Other means of preventing or discouraging war have been and are now being discussed. In some cases and to some extent they have actually been adopted. Some believe, for example, that the maintenance of peace depends on some form of economic action—international economic co-operation, removal of restrictions on world trade, and equal access to raw materials. Some emphasize social justice and social security. Others stress the importance of psychological and spiritual forces—education, creation of a world opinion, development of international morality, revival of religion. Still others pin their faith chiefly to the institutions of democracy, the growth of law and of respect for it, or wider recourse to arbitration and conciliation. Viewing Germany as the most dangerous actual or potential breeding-place of wars, many think that peace can be assured to a large extent by special measures applied to that country.

All of these procedures have merit and many are of major importance; but for various reasons we believe that they are secondary to the political arrangements more directly concerned with the use of power. On the

other hand, such arrangements should include and strengthen most or all of the procedures mentioned; and the acceptability of a political plan may largely depend on whether it is likely to advance or retard progress along economic, social, legal, judicial, and psychological lines. Accordingly, though such matters are not set up as major propositions in this book, they are frequently brought into the discussion.

While we shall look at the problem of world order principally from the standpoint of American choices, absolute *isolation* for this country is not included among our debatable plans. As a matter of fact, no one has ever proposed that the United States build a Chinese Wall around itself. Prewar isolationism was relative, not absolute; and even that has now been largely abandoned.

Furthermore, we feel that the discussion of world order should not concern itself with programs that clearly have no chance of being accepted by governments or peoples within the postwar period. Appraising popular attitudes and trends, many believe that, to be acceptable, the coming arrangements must be extremely modest. The writer thinks that the American people at the end of this struggle, if they have had courageous, intelligent, and inspiring leadership, will be prepared to go to considerable lengths in order to prevent a repetition of our two recent experiences with modern war. Nevertheless, we do not consider practical the idea of a world-state or world-federation. It is difficult to see how, unless a miracle should happen, this age-old dream can be realized at the end of the present war.

Within these limitations, the following five chapters provide brief explanations of various proposals for the achievement of durable peace. It should be kept in mind, however, that, in the general public discussion which is now developing, none of these proposals is likely to appear in precisely the same shape that it takes in this book; for each is subject to numerous variations. It would be possible, for example, in Chapter VI to present and debate several different kinds of "stronger" association. We prefer to concentrate on what seems to be for our purposes a fair sample, one that suggests the main issues without too much confusion over details.

When these five chapters had been typed, the author tried to guess what effect they might have on that hypothetical person called the Layman or the General Reader. It seemed that he might express himself somewhat as follows: "When I finished reading this baker's dozen of proposals, with the arguments for and against them, I had become repeatedly a believer and in turn an unbeliever. In every case, though first converted by the affirmative, I finally gave the decision to the negative! In the end, my impression was that all the proposals were of about equal importance, that the various arguments on one side or the other seemed to have about the same weight, except that the *pros* were invariably knocked out by the *cons*, and that in the end every single one of these plans had been eliminated."

If an actual reader should get such an impression, the cause may lie partly in the method of presentation, according to which the opponents of a plan have the last word. Were the proponents given opportunity for re-

buttal, the advantage might easily swing back to them. For this book outlines only the beginnings of an argument, which needs to be and will be carried on through many rebuttals, replications, and rejoinders. Furthermore, with so many different proposals under discussion, the advocates of one proposal have against them practically all of those who favor any of the other proposals. Plan one, in order to win the debate, must overthrow a number of other plans. Each is in a free-for-all and therefore fighting against odds.

It would be misleading to suppose that all arguments are of the same weight. Arguments cannot be properly weighted in this little book. Before final conclusions are reached the evidence and the reasoning will have to be further examined and evaluated.

Likewise, plans and proposals are not all on the same plane; they are not necessarily worthy of the same attention; and they are not in all cases to be viewed as alternatives. Acceptance of one proposal does not require the absolute rejection of all others. Two or more plans may be combined. A scheme may be accepted in part and rejected in part. Compromises are possible.

The reader should not assume that all possible arguments are previewed in this book. For one thing, the evidence is not all in. Fresh facts and interpretations are constantly appearing; and by mulling over the old facts we see them in new lights. Situations involved in the argument are changing as the war goes on. One will notice, too, the absence from this book of appeals to "authorities," although practically every plan is endorsed or condemned by prominent persons, whose

knowledge and judgment should carry weight. Finally, we try to eliminate from our debate all clearly illegitimate kinds of persuasion; but it seems hardly practicable to attempt the exclusion of everything that might be construed as misrepresentation or as directed to the emotions, prejudices, and fears.

It may be well to repeat that no set of arguments herein presented necessarily reflects the author's views. He includes some arguments that seem to him weak, unsound, or easily answered, hoping that these may act as a mental inoculation that will produce immunity to at least some of the microbes and poisons that lurk in public discussion.

Particular attention is called to a number of words that are used by our mythical disputants. Each of these words is something of a pitfall for the incautious reader and even more so for the unwary listener. Some are packed with emotion. Some are vast vague abstractions, conveying different meanings or impressions to different people. Many of these words have a moral slant: some are "good"; some, "bad." Some have been used so loosely or broadly that they have almost no meaning left. The following are examples: collectivism, co-ordination, destiny, federal union, have-not, imperialism, liberalism, Monroe Doctrine, nationalistic, regionalism, social justice, theoretical, Utopian, visionary. When these or similar words are used and their meaning is not made clear and definite, the reader or listener should be especially on his guard.

In the course of our polemics, it is nowhere contended that because a plan is simple it ought to be adopted or

because it is complicated it ought to be rejected. One common means of attacking public proposals is to make them appear so intricate that people will give them up as too tiresome to bother with. Nothing could be more complex than the government of the United States or our industrial system; but neither could operate at all if it were really made simple. Any plan for the establishment and maintenance of world order is bound to be complicated; and, in the large and in the long run, no one course of action, if adapted to the purpose, is likely to be much simpler than another.

The facts, stated or alleged, that appear in this book are in most cases extremely generalized. Some of these generalizations attempt to summarize in a few words a large number of specific occurrences and conditions. Others represent conclusions from, rather than statements of, facts. Most generalizations reflect personal judgment and personal opinion, and are more or less vague. The idea, whether true or false, that the League of Nations "failed" because of the absence of the United States is partly a conclusion and partly an opinion. As a further example, it is asserted that all the members of a league or association of nations must be democracies. This assertion and its denial are partly conclusions from facts and partly pure theory. Moreover, what do we mean by "democracies"?

In a few cases, our debaters may seem to contradict each other on matters of fact. For example, the assertion will be found in one place that Russia is nationalistic and in another place that it is internationalistic. In this case there may be no actual contradiction, since

Russia, like other countries, is both nationalistic and internationalistic. All such apparent contradictions require examination to see whether they really exist. Facts do seem to be at issue when reference is made at one point to European unity and at another to European disunity and when the proposition that Orientals are peace loving is both asserted and denied. In the former case, the fact is, of course, that Europe shows evidences of both unity and disunity; and in the latter case some Orientals may be pacifistic and some may not be, or they may be peaceable under some circumstances and not under others.

In general, the arguments fall into two broad categories: (1) those concerned with the plans themselves, and (2) those concerned with the psychology of peoples and governments—their capacity and will to adopt the plan, adjust themselves to it, and make it work. The arguments can be further classified as (1) those which depend for support on experience or demonstrable facts, and (2) those that rest on general principles and assumptions. In both classifications great difficulties are encountered. Since the world is complex and ever-changing, past experience, even when known beyond dispute, is not completely relevant to our present needs. So we have to fall back on principles, assumptions, and appeals to simple common sense.

Considerations that are not strictly factual often provide fairly solid ground; but the arguments thus based are exposed to the charge of being “theoretical,” thought by some to be a thoroughly damning indictment. The period that followed the First World War was one of

disillusionment; and many are now leaning over backward in an effort to be "practical." The concrete and the abstract, like realism and idealism, are both essential; and they are not incompatible with each other. We must strive to be rational, to seek the truth, to weigh facts, and to avoid emotionalism, illusion, and wishful thinking; but we should also have a conception of the goal toward which the world should move and, to the task of attaining that goal, should bring imagination, hope, and faith.

Chapter II

AMERICA ON ITS OWN

The first possibilities and proposals to be presented are based on the idea that the United States, while assuming international responsibilities, must keep a free hand and avoid direct and formal commitments or entanglements outside this Hemisphere. This combination of independent action with an international outlook permits many variations in policy; but the various issues can be fairly well illustrated by three general programs. One of these we shall call American leadership; the second, American mastery; and the third, American balancing of power.

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

American leadership, as we employ the term, implies no sharp break with the past, no wholesale abandonment of our traditional policies. We would retain the Monroe Doctrine, the principles of Inter-Americanism, the "good-neighbor" policy, and the promotion of hemisphere solidarity. We would co-operate in disarmament movements, in the development of international law, and in the practice of conference, conciliation, and arbitration. We would accept membership in the World Court. In every possible way, we would seek to further international progress along social, humanitarian, cultural, and technical lines. The traditional features of this program would be pressed more vigorously than in the

past, in a new spirit of internationalism, with a larger conception of our responsibilities, and for one purpose above all—to maintain peace and order throughout the world. To the practical support of our leadership we would bring power of three sorts—moral, economic, and military.

FOR the program of American leadership the following arguments may be advanced:

1. The program represents growth or evolution, in contrast with creation, revolution, or the method of “blueprinting” the future. Political organizations and institutions, if they are to be sound, satisfactory, and permanent, must come into existence little by little, by piecemeal additions and improvements, through a process of experimentation and learning from experience. Note the evolution of the British government, its “broadening down from precedent to precedent.” In general, the British habit is to move slowly and to act only when compelled to do so by a concrete situation. This “practical” disposition has been fully justified by Britain’s political accomplishments and cultural contributions. World peace and world order are impossible without law; but international law can develop only gradually from its present extremely primitive state. American policies, adopted over the years to meet practical situations, not only are consistent with the evolution of the law but will offer a sound framework for international organization, when the world is ready to be organized.

2. The American people will accept this program; and it is not likely to be abandoned or half-heartedly

executed. Rooted in history, it is national rather than partisan. A remarkable present-day phenomenon is the existence in all countries of opposition to war and



apathy in the midst of it. It is reasonable to believe, therefore, that after this latest experience of horror public opinion, more pacific and more alert than ever before, will be able in all countries to check policies tending to war. But the public, to develop an opinion, needs leadership. This, the United States will supply.

3. Our moral power can be effective if it is used consistently and positively. It is producing results in the Western Hemisphere. Europe and Asia believe that America is sincere. The twentieth century is to be the century of peoples, equal and united, no longer divided into grasping hostile groups. Peoples' freely communicating with one another, will be receptive to spiritual impulses. Our own influence is great, resting as it does on our democracy, our humanitarianism, our decisive intervention in the war, and the fact that America typi-

fies a peaceful and tolerant international community. We can be, once again, an inspiration and an example to the world.

4. Because of the economic resources of the United States, we can make a most telling contribution to world peace merely through our economic policies; and, in addition, we can prevent war by bringing economic pressure to bear on aggressor nations.

5. Because of our military power, we can provide for our own security, which ought to be the first objective of our policy.

6. On the whole, it is a well-rounded program. No feature, standing alone, can be considered a panacea; but all elements in combination are of primary importance and real promise.

AGAINST the program of American leadership the following statements may be presented:

1. The program looks much like a return to nineteenth century liberalism or like the more recent isolationism plus some new good intentions. As soon as we have withdrawn from Europe and Asia and once more decided on nonentanglement, we shall become immersed in our internal affairs and forget our good intentions. When danger-signs appear on the horizon, we shall again fail to recognize them, for the situation will be new. History does not repeat itself.

The idea of nonentanglement in European affairs has been twice discredited. By avoiding the lesser entanglements in peace we have incurred the greater and graver entanglement of war. Moreover, if we are bound by ob-

ligations of morals, wisdom, and will, we do not retain freedom of action or remain completely independent. Any responsibility means entanglement, if it means anything.

2. Political "growth" and political "evolution" are figures of speech. Changes in political institutions must be willed by men. If they are not so willed, they just do not happen. While these changes are often piecemeal, those responsible for them may be and frequently are in agreement on a general principle or an ultimate objective. Consider some of the steps in the building of Britain's democracy; for example, the Reform Bill of 1832, the Parliamentary Representation Act of 1867, and the Parliament Act of 1911. These things did not "just happen." They fitted into a pattern already accepted. Moreover, while human beings have to learn their political lessons bit by bit, it is sometimes possible to embody in a single institutional development the results of many experiences over a long period. An example of such an embodiment is the Constitution of the United States. Left to themselves, political forms and practices, instead of growing into something better, are quite as likely to degenerate into something worse. "Growth" is sometimes malignant.

As a matter of fact, we have already experimented with various types of international organization and procedure, and the knowledge and intelligence available to governments is now sufficient for a certain and solid accomplishment. It should be easy after this war to obtain the public support necessary to get a new and more radical plan adopted and make it work after its

adoption. But a clear assurance of public support may not be necessary. In some cases people can be best "prepared" for a change after the change has taken place; and the psychology that makes an organization work may be created in part after the organization is established.

3. If we put our own economic house in order we shall have made a substantial contribution to world peace; but can we achieve economic stability and economic progress internally until we have first set up the new conditions that are necessary to a prosperous world? Can we retain political nationalism and eliminate economic nationalism? The economic power that we shall have at the end of the war may be less, not more, than it has been in the recent past. In any event, the political use of economic power means more collectivism and more authoritarianism, with, incidentally, more entanglement and more risk.

4. We should not be too sure about our moral power, or too confident that our moral standards are rising. The only nations that need to be impressed by our moralizing have different standards and, anyway, consider us hypocrites. In the Western Hemisphere, the results of moral leadership have been negligible. What has counted most is the wealth and military strength of this country.¹

It is true that Americanism has been in many ways more revolutionary and more successful than any other *ism*; but, in the future, the ideological influence of

¹ See below, pp. 53-58.

America, if it is to be effective, must be given a concrete international form.

5. The program leaves untouched the basic causes of war. It makes no new provision for the creation and application of enough power to maintain order. Let us assume what is not probable, that the United States will be willing to apply economic sanctions, and, if these are insufficient, military sanctions. The likelihood that a pacific nation will apply sanctions depends in large measure on the possibility of war resulting from that action; and the possibility of war depends to an extent on whether nations are disarmed. This program gives no assurance of disarmament, since it does not provide for collective security.² Sanctions are effective only when their application is certain and prompt; but, under the proposed program, the exercise of coercion would never be certain and would usually be too late. Finally, one may question the general soundness and practicability of economic sanctions, since they hurt the innocent along with the guilty and may disturb economic stability and interrupt economic progress.³

6. The program under discussion makes no new arrangement for peaceful change.

AMERICAN MASTERY

The second form of independent internationalism stresses the economic and military power of the United States, and assumes a frequent, vigilant, and aggressive

² See also pp. 75-76, 84.

³ See also pp. 78, 87-88.

use of that power to maintain world order. It is believed that, through this new and wider interventionism, wars can be localized; and in the meantime continued efforts would be made to develop international law and the practice of consultation, conciliation, arbitration, and disarmament.

ADVOCATES of American mastery may argue their case as follows:

1. World order cannot be maintained unless the United States guarantees it or participates in guaranteeing it. Moral and economic leadership by this country is not enough, even with adequate military preparedness. The aggressor nations will have to be disarmed and, this time, kept disarmed. Certain unstable areas will require policing or assistance. The job cannot be done collectively; but, even if it could, the United States is not prepared to surrender any of its freedom of action to either a limited or a universal association of nations.

An American guarantee of peace, backed by American power, is for us the most realistic,⁴ the least expensive, and least dangerous course. Under modern conditions, any conflict, left to develop, involves the whole world. When war threatens, the only choice is between a long and costly struggle and a short, cheap, localized preventive action. Actually, there would be no wars at all, except with our consent, if it were known that the United States would move promptly and powerfully at the first sign of aggressive intention.

2. It is now entirely practicable for the United States

⁴ See p. 74.

to take the responsibility for policing the world. At the end of this war the Axis powers will be disarmed and it will be relatively easy to keep them disarmed. The occupied countries, when they come out from under



Hitler's heel, will retain little of their former military establishments or taste for militarism.

3. One can give Hitler credit for seeing that the international system of today can be reduced to order and kept in order only by force. The only alternative to his World Order of enslavement is an Order based on American headship, maintained by American power, and dedicated to freedom.

4. American mastery is identical with the more desirable features of imperialism; and these features offer

the only means by which peace has ever been maintained for any length of time over any large part of the earth. Thus, the ancient world enjoyed a Roman Peace and the world of the nineteenth century a British Peace (*Pax Britannica*).

The world-wide Empire that Britain built was on the whole liberal and progressive. More than that, British power limited conflicts in Europe to short localized wars. For the world as a whole, the period from 1815 to 1914 was one of relative peace and unprecedented progress. The major factors in the development and exercise of British power were an insular situation and naval supremacy.

Britain is no longer strong enough to play alone the role of world policeman, international umpire, and missionary of democracy. The airplane challenges both her insularity and her command of the seas.

5. The responsibilities formerly carried by Britain must be taken over by the United States. We cannot stop historical evolution or escape destiny. This is America's century. We shall come out of this war the world's greatest military power, greatest not only in actual armament but also in industrial production. Our territory, contrasted with that of Britain, is more compact; but, with relation to Europe and Asia, we enjoy an insular position, in spite of air power. Thus, we can intervene with a minimum of risk, and can easily hold supremacy in the air as well as on the sea. Measured in miles, the centers of disturbance are distant from us; but, measured in hours, the whole world is smaller now than North America was fifty years ago.

America, like Britain, stands for freedom and decency.

Our qualifications for moral leadership will go far to make our stronger and more positive role acceptable and practicable throughout the world. People do not fear oppression from us. Everywhere and from all points of view, American prestige is at its peak.

6. A policy of positive peacetime intervention is necessary because of the weakness of defense compared with offense. Successful preventive action, like strategy in general, demands complete preparedness and instant overwhelming attack. The ideas of moral and economic leadership and of collective security create a defense psychology, similar to that which weakened France, Britain, and the United States in the present war.

OPPONENTS of the proposal for American mastery have several lines of argument.

1. The task is too great for any one nation. The need of the world is for a preponderance of power dedicated to the task of upholding the law and bringing about peaceful change. It is not certain that the United States after this war will be the great military power that some imagine. This country will suffer its share of the general exhaustion. Financially, we shall have to retrench. In economics and in domestic policies we shall have our hands full without a succession of political and military adventures abroad. The American people will have no will for an indefinitely grandiose world role.

2. Our constitutional democratic government is not fitted for the job of world policeman. Such a job is beyond popular capacity, since the people would have to understand, not only the signs of international friction but also the causes and the way to remove them.

It will hardly be safe merely to sit on the lid. Our government must make itself a positive instrument of international change, the judge and lawgiver of the world. But if we wish to bring our power to bear promptly and effectively on developing international situations, we cannot risk time-consuming discussions, either popular or congressional. Therefore, our international and military affairs would have to be dictatorially controlled.

3. Our previous attempts at mastery have not been conspicuously successful. One of Theodore Roosevelt's interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine was that the United States should exercise an international police power in the Western Hemisphere. For a number of years we practiced interventions and occupations. The results in Latin America were such that we abandoned the idea of mastery by force and adopted the policy of the good neighbor—and rich uncle. Would American military mastery succeed any better or as well in Europe and Asia? In Europe, Britain and Russia will be armed. Neither is likely to take dictation from us. In Asia, China will be a formidable power. In case China and Russia should get into a dispute, how would we "crack down" on them?

4. The idea of American mastery is closely related to a holier-than-thou attitude, which Americans are prone to assume. In practice, the policy would become an exploitative and militaristic imperialism, resting on naked force, on the Hitlerian doctrine that might makes right. World mastery, if attempted, would in due time make the United States an object of universal suspicion and dislike. In the end, we would have a coalition ranged against us.

5. In 1898, as in former times, we seemed to have a "manifest destiny" to expand overseas and take up the "white man's burden"; but our destiny was not so manifest a few years later. The time for democratic imperialism was already passing. The maturing principles of democracy were incompatible with empires and interventions.

6. The analogy between Britain's role in the nineteenth century and the one now proposed for the United States is quite misleading. During the eighteenth century, Britain had acquired territory through wars which were really decided by land armies fighting in Europe. Britain was first to experience the industrial revolution; and, for a time, she reaped the benefit of a unique combination of factors.

The bulk of her empire, however, bordered upon or was adjacent to the Indian Ocean; and the chain of strategic possessions from Gibraltar to Singapore protected her communications by sea. The primary purposes of the empire were power, prestige, and profit. Peace, order, civilization, and freedom were by-products. The empire, moreover, had geographical limitations. It did not long provide a preponderance of British power in the Far East, nor, of course, in the Western Hemisphere.

After this war, America will be strategically strong, as she has been for many years, in those regions where Britain has been strategically weak; that is, in the Western Hemisphere, in the Pacific, and in the Far East. We have no territory or bases in the Mediterranean, Africa, or the Middle East. We shall have neither the power nor the willingness, which Britain had in the

heyday of her influence, to enforce a blockade and to put armies into Europe.

While America might conceivably win and maintain supremacy in the air, as Britain did on the sea, the two elements are obviously different. Air supremacy in the future may belong as logically to Russia or China as to the United States.


7. It is true that British primacy during the nineteenth century coincided with a period of comparative peace; but it does not necessarily follow that this condition was due to British mastery. Other factors were operating; among them, the general exhaustion caused by the Napoleonic wars, and the influence of the Concert of Europe. Furthermore, during the early part of this period, there was no united Italy, united Germany, or aggressive Japan for Britain to deal with. The opening of Japan in the fifties and the German unification movement in the sixties marked the first of the train of events that culminated in the World Wars of 1914 and 1939. Instead of "slapping down" the aggressor when he was still weak, Britain welcomed the growing power of Prussia and became an ally of Japan. Shortly after 1871 the armament race was on and world wars were incubating. The facts show the difficulty, if not impossibility, of detecting in time the conditions that foreshadow or produce war.

8. If Britain did maintain comparative peace in Europe during the nineteenth century, she did it by preserving an equilibrium among the great powers. Not only in the nineteenth century but also in the seventeenth and eighteenth, she played off one nation or group of nations against another and did not permit

any to become supreme on the continent or to challenge Britain's sea power. Such was the famous balance-of-power policy. Britain acted as the balancer.

AMERICAN BALANCING OF POWER

The proposal has been made that the United States should now adopt a balance-of-power policy. Such a



policy would mean a division of the strong nations into two camps. If the two sides were perfectly equal, that is, in equilibrium, neither side would dare to attack the other. In that case, America could remain in "splendid isolation." If one side were weaker than the other, the United States would throw its strength to that side, not to make war but to prevent the other side from "cashing in" on its superiority. Thus, acting as an inter-

national balancer, America could, according to this proposal, ensure world peace.

SUPPORTING a balance-of-power policy for this country the statements below may be offered.

1. Such a policy is not advanced as an ideal, total, or final solution for the world's ills. It is realistic,⁵ since it takes the world as it is and gives the United States a practical role in the international system as this system actually operates. We cannot succeed in any other form of independent internationalism and we are not yet prepared for any binding relationships or for a system of collective security.

2. A balance-of-power system in Europe, maintained by Britain as the cornerstone of her national and imperial security, did maintain comparative peace while it permitted change. To this system, in fact, may be attributed the growth of the British Empire and the remarkable progress of the nineteenth century.

3. The balance-of-power idea goes back to the beginnings of history. This fact indicates that it is natural for independent powers in competition to divide into two opposing groups. When one group becomes inferior it strives to effect some sort of realignment that will make it stronger.

4. The balance-of-power system has in the past operated most clearly in limited areas, usually in Europe. But now that the world is integrated and wars have become universal, an equilibrium to keep the peace must include all the great powers, American and Asiatic

⁵ See p. 74.

as well as European. Hitler recognized this fact when he brought Japan into the Axis alliance.

5. The United States has already served as balancer, but unconsciously and not in such a way as to preserve peace. We entered the first and the second world war because German aggression threatened to overturn the European balance. Such an overturn presents a distinct danger to us. Likewise, our aid to China is based on an interest in the Asiatic equilibrium.

6. Had it been known in advance that we were determined to maintain a balance of power, both world wars might have been prevented. Neither the Kaiser nor Hitler knew for certain that if war began the United States would fight. They were not even sure that Britain would fight. Balancers of power, to be effective, must mean business. When they are not bluffing and their intention to fight is understood, they will be spared the need to fight.

CRITICS of this proposal advance a number of facts and considerations:

1. Off and on, the world has had balances of power from the beginning. Since it has also had wars, the indications are clear that the balancing of power does not ensure durable peace. During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, when the idea was most popular, it repeatedly broke down in practice. It did not prevent the Napoleonic wars. Its breakdown in 1914 should be sufficient to discredit this policy forever.

2. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the

idea of a balancing of forces was carried over from religion and physics to the field of politics. The idea is a mechanistic one, without much likeness to reality. Many factors enter into national power; and few of them are stable. Some are not easy to calculate or predict.

3. The proposal is inconsistent with a moral or just order. It is opposed to the ideal of change. It sanctifies force. In practice, the balance-of-power policy necessitates unscrupulous diplomacy, stimulates armament and secret treaties, and leads to the partitioning and distribution of weak and backward areas. Bismarckian Germany, nineteenth century Britain, and twentieth century Japan sought for a balance everywhere except at the point where they aimed to move next for their own aggrandizement. If we adopt such a policy, we must be prepared to make cold calculations of selfish advantage; and eventually we may have to join Germany to offset Russia or come to the aid of Japan against China.

4. Our government is not politically adept enough to play this game; for it is a democracy, subject to the slow and cumbrous processes of opinion-formation and preoccupied with domestic questions. It will be noted that, when Britain played the game with some success, its government was aristocratic; the suffrage was restricted; and control was in the hands of a governing class. Popular or parliamentary control of foreign policy is not yet accepted in Great Britain to the same extent as in the United States. Parliament neither declares war nor ratifies treaties.

Chapter III

HANDS ACROSS THE SEAS

Those who doubt the effectiveness of America acting alone ask whether it is not possible for this country to share the burden with other nations. Can we not find a congenial, trustworthy, and powerful partner? Or, perhaps still better, a number of friends who will unite with us for the preservation of peace? The limited partnerships or unions that have been proposed fall into two general classes: (1) those based on race, tradition, wartime association, or ideology, and (2) those identified with regions. Combinations of the first class reach across the seas, while those of the second class, generally speaking, correspond to continents, parts of continents, or other contiguous areas.

In this chapter we shall be concerned with four proposals of the first class. These relate to: (1) an alliance between the United States and Great Britain; (2) a federation of the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations; (3) a federation of democracies; and (4) close co-operation of the United Nations.

A BRITISH-AMERICAN ALLIANCE

The proposal for a British-American alliance contemplates joint or co-operative action by the two nations for the maintenance of world peace. Each nation would presumably agree to come to the aid of the other in case of attack; and it may be assumed that they would en-

deavor jointly to keep the aggressor nations disarmed and to remove causes of international conflict. In general, the ends to be served by this alliance would be the same as those associated with American mastery, and the methods to be employed would presumably be similar.

THE AFFIRMATIVE case for a British-American alliance, as it might be formulated, is set forth below.

1. The United States needs Great Britain. In 1940, after the fall of France, when Britain alone stood against Nazi might, the American people came to realize clearly the vital part played by Britain in the maintenance of our own national security. If and when Britain and her sea power go under, we are left wide open to attack by the master power of Europe. Britain first played this vital part in our defense over a hundred years ago when in effect she underwrote the Monroe doctrine.

The First World War and the Second demonstrate that the enemy of one country is also the enemy of the other. After these two costly experiences, it should be clear by now that the United States is inevitably drawn into any major war in which Britain is involved. If our military co-operation is to be effective in the future we must begin to co-operate well in advance of the war, preparing joint plans for industrial production, holding staff discussions, and making strategic dispositions.

2. If the two countries continuously co-operate, however, neither need be involved in actual war. At the close of this struggle, both countries together will possess preponderant power, not only in actual armament

but also in wealth, industrial capacity, raw material resources, and strategic advantages. The two nations are supplementary: Britain is strong in the Mediterranean,



Africa, and the Middle East; the United States, in the Western Hemisphere, the Pacific, and the Far East. Sea power, supported by air power, will be able to enforce a system of sanctions. No would-be aggressor in the future would dare to make war if he knew that this powerful alliance would be against him.

3. The two countries have learned how to live at peace. Neither is a potential aggressor. Each has a vested interest in peace. More than that, the habits, attitudes, and outlooks that determine policy are similar in the two countries. They have common political traditions and ideals. Both are dedicated to the freedom, equality,

and welfare of the masses. Each observes standards of decency. In more ways than one, both countries speak the same language. They share the Anglo-Saxon heritage. Each is gifted with understanding and respect for other nations and each knows the art of conciliation and compromise.

4. This war is a preparation for the alliance, which will merely continue the wartime association and the expected co-operation of the reconstruction period. As a matter of fact, the United States and Britain entered into a partial alliance for 99 years when Britain leased to us the naval and air bases in the Atlantic.

5. The British people would welcome this alliance, because they realize that the general conditions which accounted for British ascendancy in the past no longer exist. Unless assured of American collaboration, Britain would have to ally herself with Russia or Germany. For our part, only in co-operation with Britain can the United States maintain a measure of isolation. Without such co-operation we must become unreservedly imperialistic. In the latter event, we shall have to bring Canada, Australia, and New Zealand within our orbit, thus contributing further to the break-up of the British Empire and to the weakening of Great Britain.

6. In alliance the two countries could divide the work of keeping the peace, Britain taking responsibility for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, the United States attending to the Western Hemisphere, the Pacific, and Eastern Asia.

7. Britain and America together are capable of exercising decisive leadership in economic matters; and it is

not possible for either, without the other, to produce that world-wide economic expansion which is expected to contribute to world order. The basis and machinery of economic co-operation and joint economic leadership are provided by the lease-lend act and its administration.

THE NEGATIVE case would doubtless include the following points.

1. In principle, is the suggested British-American alliance anything more than a blending of American "mastery" and British "ascendancy"? The arguments against either are arguments against both together. The alliance would amount to a joint undertaking to coerce the rest of the world; that is, to reduce other countries to the position of protectorates. It would simply substitute an Anglo-Saxon "New Order" for Hitler's. The motives of an Anglo-Saxon combination would be widely suspected. It would be particularly unpopular in Latin America and throughout Asia.

2. It will be impossible to keep Germany, Japan, and Italy disarmed, for Russia and China will be militarily strong. It would not be long, therefore, before the British-American partnership became involved in a world balance-of-power system. An alliance breeds counter-alliances.

3. The British-American combination will not possess a certain and permanent preponderance of power. Control of the seas gives no assurance of control on land in Europe and Asia. Neither land nor sea control is possible without control of the air. It is doubtful that the alliance

would be able to bring to bear on an aggressor in Europe or Asia the necessary proportions of power *in all three elements—sea, air, and land.*

Americans, accustomed to the British Empire as a symbol of power, are slow to realize that the Empire has long been in process of disintegration, that British prestige has been markedly declining in Asia, and that in most respects Britain has been growing weaker, while other countries have become stronger.

4. Economic sanctions enforced by sea power would not be effective against Germany. For any promise of success, sea power would have to be supported by the land power of Russia. Furthermore, an embargo applied to Germany would require either the co-operation or the rationing of the various nations that border on Germany.

5. Would Britain and the United States *use* their power? Would they be strong-willed or weak-willed? They would be ineffective if influenced too much by insular psychology, isolationism, pacifism, or preoccupation with social progress, or if their democratic processes produced delay, uncertainty, or vacillation in decisions and actions. In view of their past behavior, their joint undertaking for the future would fall far short of guaranteeing security or preventing war. Power and wealth have little significance without corresponding resources in statesmanship and leadership.

6. Could Britain hold up her end of the job in Europe and the Middle East? Probably not, unless we can assume the friendly disposition of Russia and the permanent impotence of Germany. If Britain's military strength were sufficient, could we depend on her politi-

cal wisdom and courage? Could she depend on ours?

7. In the event of an alliance, the policies and actions of the two countries would have to be closely and constantly co-ordinated, not only in military matters, but also in peacetime diplomacy and in various aspects of domestic affairs. Each country would be vitally interested in any action of the other that might occasion conflict. Can we expect in peacetime a continual agreement between the two governments? It will be remembered that after the First World War, when Britain and France should have been co-operating, political changes in one country or the other put an end to agreements that had been painfully reached, compelled new negotiations on new bases, and did much to damage the prospects of peace. The probability is that a British-American alliance would be merely a stopgap and short-lived, like other alliances have been, and generally inefficient in its operation, like most of the others.

8. The two countries have much in common; but we shall make a poor contribution to internationalism if we draw a line between Anglo-Saxons and other people, with an assumption of Anglo-Saxon superiority. In any event, the United States is not predominantly Anglo-Saxon. We have large groups in our country that are traditionally hostile rather than friendly to the British. In Britain, there is profound skepticism of America's continued willingness to assume international responsibilities. The interests of the United States and Great Britain are not the same. In the economic sphere, competition is as likely as co-operation. In time of peace, the prevention of war will not be viewed by either

country as a paramount interest. British power depends on British industrial strength. Can we or should we make it our business to bolster British industry?

9. The British Empire and its lifeline would have to be guaranteed by the United States, if the power of the alliance were to be maintained. Are we prepared to undertake such a sweeping guarantee of the *status quo*?

10. The rejection of a British-American alliance would not necessarily throw Britain into the arms of Germany or Russia. But British-Russian co-operation should be welcomed by the United States, as essential to the maintenance of peace in Europe; and British-German co-operation need not be feared. If Britain is as friendly to us as we think she is, why should we feel threatened by any alliance that includes Britain? Perhaps a British-German partnership would be the best means of neutralizing and regenerating Germany.

ANGLO-AMERICAN FEDERAL UNION

A British-American alliance might or might not include the British Commonwealth of Nations, since Eire and the four dominions—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—are practically independent of Great Britain. The proposal for an Anglo-American federal union contemplates a federation of all seven nations—the United States, Great Britain, Eire, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

A federation is to be distinguished from a league or confederation. In the latter, the member-states retain their sovereignty or supreme power and the central government can only request: it cannot command or coerce. When the thirteen American colonies declared

their independence of Britain, they formed a confederation. This was replaced in 1789 by a federation, which, as the Preamble of our Constitution says, is "a more



perfect union." In such a union, the central government has full authority to make and enforce laws; but the states also retain powers. Thus, union and a degree of centralization are joined with local freedom and local self-government. Moreover, in a federation the people are given direct representation in the legislative branch of the central government.

The proposal for an Anglo-American federal union envisages a central government with real but limited powers, which, at the least, would include control of all military and international affairs. The federation would not be exclusive. Other nations, provided they are democratic, would be encouraged to join it.

IN FAVOR of an Anglo-American federal union, the reasoning may be summed up about as follows.

1. Arguments based on concrete estimates of resources and military power are a trifle stronger than those offered for a British-American alliance. From the governmental angle, however, the federal union should be much more effective than the alliance. The union will have one mind, one foreign office, one central authority equipped to make and carry out decisions, a single administration for the mobilization and co-ordination of resources, and a unified military command. Those potential aggressors who might question the purpose or efficiency of an alliance could have no doubt, when the federal union spoke, that it meant business.

2. Arguments based on community of feeling are also similar to those presented for a British-American alliance. These Anglo-Saxon nations are united by language, history, culture, religion, free political institutions, and devotion to peace. They possess common fears and a common danger. They are divided by the sea, but this they control. Since a real community must exist before nations can co-operate, an Anglo-American federal union is the first and essential step toward a larger international organization.

3. Federal union reconciles power with democracy and achieves a workable compromise with the principle of nationalism. The nations formerly independent can remain self-governing in all matters that are not of common concern.

4. Anything short of federation would have perpetuated in this country the anarchy and chaos that have

reigned in Europe. In fact, the thirteen independent states that emerged from our Revolution soon fell into quarrels and trade rivalries. Union brought peace, prosperity, and progress with an enlargement of the freedom of the individual.

5. An Anglo-American federal union presents difficulties, but it can be made acceptable to both sides. On the basis of proportioned representation, the people of the United States would have a majority in the lower house of the union legislature, while equal representation of states would give the British control of the upper house. Thus, each side would have adequate assurance that its special interests would be protected. Why should we object to the annexation of the British Commonwealth of Nations? Canada and Australia are already gravitating into our orbit. Why should the British object to taking back a people who once were a part of the Empire? In two wars, as a matter of fact, we have united with them. The national sovereignty that we are so afraid of losing is partly a myth. To the extent that it is real, it is akin to the theory of the absolute state that Anglo-Saxons reject.

6. Like the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations is offered as a model for world organization, and as a very substantial start toward world order. In this unique political system, legally independent nations have learned to live in understanding, peace, freedom, and tolerance.

7. Anglo-American federal union is a way to escape some difficult choices for both the British and ourselves. If Britain must seek security in a European organiza-

tion, the dominions will drift farther from her. If she cannot choose the United States, she must choose between Europe and the dominions. If the United States rejects union with the English-speaking peoples, it will be necessary for us to draw Canada, Australia, and New Zealand definitely into our own security system, whatever it may be.

IN OPPOSITION to the plan for an Anglo-American federal union attention may be drawn to the statements below.

1. The union would not provide any overwhelming aggregation of power. Materially and politically, it would be only slightly better equipped than a British-American alliance. Wide dispersion of power would be a weakness. The union would be vulnerable at dozens of points. A unified government, in place of divided counsels, would be an improvement; but no political change can solve the problem of democratic pacifism or make democracy efficient in dealing with world anarchy.

2. A community of feeling does exist; but political institutions and habits are by no means similar. How can Britain's Crown and hereditary nobility be reconciled with our own political traditions? The peacetime psychological barriers between the United States and Britain are so great that a union of the two countries, even with the dominions added, would be out of the question.

3. The countries proposed to be united are scattered over the earth. Though the world is smaller than it used to be, this federation would encounter enormous ad-

ministrative difficulties. As a system of government, it might be unworkable because of its size. Democracy's burden in both the United States and Great Britain is already too heavy and too complex. As a matter of fact, federation in the United States has already been replaced by centralization; and, in the British Empire as a whole, federation has not even been tried. The trend for many years has been away from it and toward complete disintegration. It would be difficult enough to reconcile parliamentary or cabinet government in the British nations with presidential government in the United States; but how could a two-party system be made to operate throughout this vast and sprawling federation? In the United States, Canada, and Australia, experience has shown that a federal system under relatively simple conditions is not easy to work. Is it possible, then, to operate a federation of federations, more political wheels within wheels?

4. An Anglo-Saxon federal union would find in power politics its sole reason for being. This being so, it would provoke counter-combinations of conceivably superior power and greater maneuverability.

5. This federation would not be analogous to the United States. The thirteen states had never been absolutely independent of one another, as Britain and the United States have been for more than a century and a half.

6. The British Commonwealth of Nations is not a good model or a likely nucleus. It still has a Mother Country; and its strongest ties are ties of blood. Its constitutional, legal, or governmental links are the weakest.

7. The proposal for Anglo-American federation dis-

regards regional claims.¹ It attempts to pull Britain away from Europe and the United States away from Latin America. Federation represents an extreme choice that neither country is compelled to make. Both can be included and work together in another sort of organization.

8. Adoption of this proposal would necessitate a fundamental modification of the Constitution of the United States, as well as the framing and ratification of a superconstitution for the federation. In other respects, the difficulties and reasons for delay are so numerous and important that the proposal does not lie within the range of practical politics. To discuss it may do harm by diverting attention from more feasible projects.


A UNION OF DEMOCRACIES

We now come to the idea of a still larger federation, to include not only the Anglo-Saxon nations, but also the democracies of western and northern Europe. These are eight in number: France, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. From the standpoint of general governmental organization, this proposal is essentially the same as that for Anglo-American federal union. A central government, representing the people as well as the member-states, would divide powers and functions with fifteen state governments, of which our federal government at Washington would be one.

AGREEMENT with the proposal for a union of democracies rests on an argument the general trend of which is herewith indicated.

¹ See pp. 49-50.

1. This union would confront any aggressor or combination of aggressors with a formidable massing of economic, industrial, and military power.



2. These fifteen nations form a real community. They have the same general culture, a common acceptance of democratic principles, and a settled devotion to peace. They speak several different languages; but experience has shown that difference of language is no insuperable obstacle to political unification. Prior to the Nazi attack, all of these nations had achieved internal stability without sacrificing freedom. All were finding the "middle way" between *laissez-faire* and authoritarian economics.

3. Large samplings of the eight European peoples are to be found in the United States and British dominions. Scandinavians are numerous in the United States. So are the Dutch in both the United States and South

Africa; and there is a large French group in Canada.

4. After the war, these European peoples will be ready and willing to unite with the Anglo-Saxons. When in the summer of 1940 Churchill offered France union with Britain, the French Cabinet came close to accepting. Five of the eight nations have been attacked, conquered, occupied, and looted by the Germans. They must now be convinced that for them security is not to be achieved through national independence, isolation, neutrality, or a policy of defense or appeasement. The other three—Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland—must realize that they are independent in name only.

5. A loose alliance of these nations is not enough to ensure their security. The need is for *united* and *prompt* action. A coalition of 15 independent governments, depending on diplomatic negotiation, could not act at all. As a result, the democracies would be overcome in detail, precisely as they were in 1940.

6. Woodrow Wilson's original plan for the League of Nations was that it should be "a concert of free peoples," with membership limited to the democratic nations. No basis for co-operation can exist between popular governments and tyrannies. Consequently, a union of democracies is the only logical and workable evolutionary approach to the ultimate organization of the world.

DISAGREEMENT with this proposal is expressed by the following brief.

1. The proposed union of democracies would have more relation to the problem of preventing war if it were not concerned wholly with nations that have been dur-

ably at peace with one another. Its effect on other nations would depend: (1) on the federation's power, and (2) on its will. While the potential military strength of the proposed union is impressive, it would not necessarily overwhelm any other combination that might be formed. The application of the union's power would be handicapped by the following factors: (a) the vulnerability of the continental portion of the union to a blitzkrieg by land and air; (b) the general dispersion of the union and its possessions all over the globe; (c) the slowness with which action would be taken by so vast a political organization, assuming that it remained a democracy; and (d) the certainty that sectionalism would be a pronounced feature of the union's government, producing compromise, lag, and, in some cases probably, partial or total paralysis. The union would inherit, magnify, and perpetuate the deficiencies of its member states—their pacifism, defensive psychology, and lethargy.

2. While these nations have much in common, there are important and deep-seated differences among them. The war has not necessarily brought them closer together psychologically. In any case, it will be impossible to know the feelings of the continental states until some time after the war. A measure of ideological uniformity may be necessary in a federation, but not in an organization solely designed to preserve peace. After the war some of these fifteen nations may for a time accept dictatorship, and they may need to if a period of disturbance intervenes.

3. A union of democracies would put Britain and the United States 100 per cent into Europe. We who have

been thinking of the British Isles as our European bastion and base and the Atlantic as our protection, would have to think in terms of the Karelian Isthmus, the Baltic, the Albert Canal, the Alps, and of a long common frontier with Germany. The United States and Britain would be married to Europe with no hope of divorce.


America and Great Britain would become automatically the guarantors of the boundaries and territorial integrity of eight of Germany's neighbors, thus freezing the *status quo*. It would be natural to expect that the Germans and probably other outsiders would interpret the union as (a) an Anglo-Saxon empire, not much different in principle from Hitler's New Order, and (b) a movement for the encirclement and strangulation of Germany.

CLOSE CO-OPERATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

All of the countries known as the "United Nations" have fought or are fighting against Germany or Japan or both. The proposal is that after the war these nations shall continue in close collaboration both economically and politically, for the purpose of promoting prosperity and preserving peace. "Co-operation" and "collaboration" may mean different things to different people. In the present connection, they imply a general alliance operating through conferences and special boards.

ARGUMENTS FOR this plan might include the following allegations and views.

1. No other type of limited alliance or federation will be practicable or effective; and no universal association of nations will work. When all "blueprint" schemes are



eliminated, the United Nations remain as a practical going concern, a real international organization forged out of hard necessities and subjected to the most exacting of practical tests. Here we have already a real association of nations, a sound basis from which the ultimate world order will evolve.

2. In this association rests an undeniable preponderance of power, since it includes the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China. The small European countries are ready, for the sake of security, to subordinate themselves to one or another of the great powers in this group.

3. None of these nations will have aggressive intentions in the future. In general, they have been peace

loving and have tended to associate with one another in the past.

4. In this combination, Russia is the element that promises success in the maintenance of peace as well as in the winning of the war. Russia is a continent in itself, both a European and an Asiatic power. Russia is internationalist. The country is at least nominally federalistic in structure, tolerating and giving a measure of autonomy to various separate nationalities. This federalistic structure was designed to receive other communistic countries, and eventually to be world-wide in extent. This idea of world revolution and of a world organization based on communism has long since been renounced. In fact, communism in Russia has been partly abandoned. Thus, no serious obstacles are put in the way of Russia's collaboration with the western nations because of economic ideology or a differing concept of internationalism.

The fact that Russia has changed sides since this war started shows that the importance of ideology in international relations may easily be overestimated. As a member of the League of Nations and a participant in disarmament conferences, Russia showed a sincere desire to promote peace, along with refreshing evidence of realistic idealism. The Declaration of Friendship between Poland and Russia, signed December 4, 1941, indicates that understanding is replacing distrust in Eastern Europe. The toll exacted of Russia by the war, its devastated areas, and its still undeveloped condition in general assures the peaceful nature of its policy for a long future.

Politically, Russia is a dictatorship. It was too much to expect that the Russian people could pass in one leap from Czarist absolutism to genuine democracy. Stalin's dictatorship is of such a type, however, that it does not stand in the way of co-operation with the democracies.

5. After this war, China with her 400 million people will be the great Asiatic power. Her relations with Russia and India and her traditional friendship for the United States are substantial forces making for future co-operation. Endowed with an ancient civilization, peace loving at heart, and now thoroughly familiar with Japanese tendencies, the Chinese people, given a fair chance, should play a worthy part in this association of nations.

OBJECTIONS may be made to the proposition that durable peace will be assured by continuing the co-operation of the United Nations.

1. The significance of the wartime co-operation of the United Nations may be easily overemphasized. If we take the present organization of the United Nations and expect a world order to develop from it by a more or less unconscious process of evolution, we may be grievously disappointed. This idea of something evolving from a haphazard war alliance seems pretty much to repudiate the idea of planning. We are asked to believe that some provisional agencies, mainly engaged in the prosecution of war, will develop into the means of maintaining peace. We are asked to believe that the people who staff these agencies will be qualified to engineer a vast and intricate evolution. If the co-opera-

tion of the United Nations is to "evolve" into a peace system, just how is it going to evolve? Where are the embryonic organs through which applied power is to prevent war? When and how is the alliance to become something else?

2. Is it safe to depend on a war line-up for the beginnings of a peace system? If such a system is to work in Europe, Germany must be a part of it. An association restricted to the United Nations would look like a hostile combination and, as such, would hardly encourage a change of spirit in the German people.

3. When the Axis powers are defeated and disarmed, the United Nations will undoubtedly possess a clear preponderance of power; but again a doubt arises whether this power would in practice be exercised. The alliance will be loose; and the nations that compose it diverse. In Europe, these nations are in two distinct groups: the Western European and the Eastern. When war and reconstruction are over, what will be left to bind them together?

4. Of these nations, seven are occupied by the Nazis. Their governments are in exile. What their governments and policies will finally be can not be determined until some time after the war.

5. Beyond adhering to the Roosevelt-Churchill Declaration, Russia has given no sign of going in for a new internationalism. On the contrary, Stalin's war addresses have been strictly nationalistic. China's future attitude and power are rendered uncertain by the possibility of disunity, governmental incompetence, and general instability in that country.

Chapter IV

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Various proposals are concerned with (1) regional federations, and (2) other regional combinations, such as alliances, leagues, customs unions, security pacts, etc. Such regional arrangements may be considered either as steps or stages in the evolution of a universal world order, as substitutes for a universal order, or as something to be combined with a world-wide system.

Anything that is done in small and relatively stable regions like Central America and Scandinavia could not have much effect on the establishment and maintenance of world order. Accordingly, those who discuss regional arrangements usually talk of hemispheres, continents, and other areas of comparable size.¹ Since we are concerned here with only the outstanding questions and issues, this chapter will present the pros and cons of such arrangements: (1) in general, (2) in the Western Hemisphere, (3) in Europe, and (4) in Asia. Africa, though a continent, is not given separate consideration, since the possibilities of that region relate in the main to colonial administration and the development of economic areas, rather than to any independent organization of political power.

¹ We are here concerned with only the simplest of the proposals based on geography. We make no attempt at a full presentation of the various types of geo-economic and geo-political conceptions which seek to determine regions on the basis of one or another combination of racial, social, economic, geological, and political factors.

At this point, we are concerned with regionalism simply as a general idea or general method.

IN GENERAL

CHAMPIONS of this idea or method will be heard from first.

1. Anything short of an actual federation of nations fails to preserve peace because it fails to touch national sovereignty. A world federation is not yet attainable. It is true that in some respects the world should be treated as a political unit, because it is already an economic unit. But nationalistic sentiment is deeply rooted and human beings are attached to localities. Disconnected or maritime federations, such as those referred to in the preceding chapter, are projected on an unsound geographic basis and, if established, would tend to disintegrate, like the British Empire. Neither ocean nor sea creates a community; because the "watery main" means distance, and distance means separation. In modern times, not a single nation surrounds a large sea; note the Baltic, the North, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Black, the Caspian, the Red, the Yellow, the China Seas, and the Sea of Japan.

While people do not ordinarily unite or remain united across large bodies of water, except when forced to by imperialism, history does show a tendency among peoples that are neighbors on land to combine into larger governmental units. Great Britain, Germany, and Italy are examples of this tendency. Each consisted at one time of numerous independent and warring states. Accordingly, the way to attain world peace is through a

step-by-step enlargement of ordered areas until a relatively few great federations are left. When these federate, war will finally be made impossible. Moreover, the safeguarding of cultural diversity demands a gradual transition region by region from the independent nation to the world organization.

2. Without world organization, we shall have a reasonable expectation of world peace as soon as federation has established peace on each continent. World wars start within continents, usually within Europe; and continental peace systems will prevent such wars from starting. Furthermore, a few great federations would mean a real world balance of power.

3. That a universal league must be decentralized was proved by experience with the League of Nations. Regional organization is required to perform the decentralized functions; and it is useless to set up a universal association until provision is made for regional organs properly co-ordinated.

CHALLENGERS of regionalism as an approach to world order might reason along the following lines.

1. One may readily admit the desirability of regional organization; but, thus far, every discussion of the relationship of regionalism to world order has been of the vaguest character. No one has yet explained how regional federation can solve a world problem.

The world does have areas of relative separateness; but is it desirable to emphasize their separateness? Regionalism may easily become another and a worse kind of isolationism. From some angles, the idea may look

like a revival of the discredited sphere-of-influence policy.

Regionalism, to be sure, is a doctrine that the United States has followed in its own fashion in the Western Hemisphere; but, in another fashion, it is a Nazi and a Japanese doctrine.

2. From the standpoint of political organization, the significant regions do not coincide with hemispheres or continents. Where substantial regional bases can be found for federation, the federations would not be large enough to make any considerable contribution to world peace. War cannot be prevented merely by adding to the number of great powers or increasing their size.

3. Regional organizations, even if regions could be clearly identified, would not produce a new, better, or more lasting balance of power. On the contrary, a permanent *unbalance* would be practically certain. If a preponderance rather than a balance of power is desired, regional organization does not assure that the resulting preponderance will be *dedicated to peace*. Every scheme of continental association implies leadership or domination by a great power, a setup similar to that of Prussian-dominated Germany.

Regional organization provides for peaceful change, collective security, and disarmament only within regions, not between regions.

4. Federation by continents would mean that future wars would be intercontinental from the beginning. If Europe were united and dominated by Germany and if Asia were united and dominated by Japan, the Ameri-

can continents would be more liable to attack than they now are. The development of air power makes intercontinental aggression much more likely than in the past. Continental federation would eliminate all buffer states. The adoption of regionalism in the years before the Second World War would have meant the encirclement of the United States.

5. It would be impossible to set up at one time a co-ordinated system reconciling world-wide interests with regional interests. At this time, we must concentrate on either the universal system or the regional system. Regional federation, except perhaps in Eastern Europe, has gone as far as it can be expected to go; and in Eastern Europe, it should be recalled, disintegrating tendencies seem over the years to have been stronger than integrating. Strange as it may seem, a universal association is likely to be more generally acceptable after this war than any large-scale regional association.

IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Under the name of the Monroe Doctrine, regionalism in relation to the Western Hemisphere long ago found an important place in American foreign policy. The Monroe Doctrine sprang from a belief that the young republics of this hemisphere had little in common with the ancient, monarchical, and quarrelsome European system, and from a fear that the Holy Alliance would intervene in Latin America. The United States proposed to avoid entanglement in Europe and to keep Europe out of this hemisphere. From about 1900 to the late

twenties, the Doctrine was held to justify armed intervention by the United States in Latin-American affairs. The "good-neighbor" policy of recent years rejects such procedures and puts more emphasis on "Inter-Americanism," on collective action by the American nations. Cooperation is carried on through the Pan American Union, the annual inter-American conferences, standing committees, and periodical meetings. Within this framework, a certain amount of uniformity and unity is obtained by consultations, declarations, and agreements. For the prevention of conflict, stress is laid on consultation, conciliation, and arbitration.

Is a regional association of nations in this hemisphere essential to the peace and security of the peoples concerned and to world order?

THE YEAS on this question might explain their position as follows.

1. From the political point of view, the Western Hemisphere is a region. It is separated by the oceans from Europe and Asia. History also sets the two Americas apart from the rest of the world. Their revolutionary and subsequent history has established a powerful tradition of independence. All the nations of this hemisphere have accepted the doctrines of constitutional and republican government. All are put in similar peril by a European or Asiatic aggressor. Cultural ties among them are growing in number and strength. Canada no longer holds aloof from Pan America.

2. A regional association of nations already exists in this hemisphere; and it is based on independence, equal-

ity, and mutual respect. "Yankee Imperialism" is a thing of the past. Suspicion of the United States has lessened. This association has been practical in conception and



has developed from time to time and adapted itself to new situations.

3. International wars within the hemisphere have been few and far between. The New World is assured as much peace as human beings can reasonably expect.

4. Inter-American solidarity guarantees security from external aggression. Inter-Americanism, as well as the vital interests of the United States, requires and makes feasible an adequate system of military defense for the hemisphere; and sound economic policies will make the Americas reasonably self-sufficient.

5. Inter-American association will make a substantial

contribution to world order. It has already provided an inspiring and instructive example; and many consider it a model for the world to copy. When other continents develop similar organs and attitudes, the danger of war should be greatly diminished; and it may vanish altogether when machinery is set up for inter-continental or inter-regional consultation and conciliation.

THE NAYS might have the following to say in regard to the importance of hemispheric association.

1. The Western Hemisphere is not a politically significant region. It consists of two separate continents, not one. Canada is a part of the British Empire. Below the bulge of Brazil, South America is nearer Europe than the United States, and is for us a strategic liability.

The hemisphere as a whole is not an economic unit. The United States is closest economically, as well as geographically, to the Caribbean countries, and enjoys a fairly close economic relationship with Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia; but the southern South American countries trade predominantly with Europe and are, in large part, competitors of the United States. Moreover, while the Latin-American countries are largely dependent on foreign commerce, they do not trade much with each other.

Culturally, though Latin Americans are closer to the United States than in the past, they still have more in common with Europeans than with us. The difference of language is a real barrier.

Politically, the American nations do not have common institutions and ideals. It is true that we have a similar

(but not the same) revolutionary background; but few of the Latin-American countries are really attached to democratic principles. Most of them maintain undemocratic class systems. Intermittently or chronically, they are governed by dictatorships.

Psychologically, Pan-American solidarity has never become a reality; and no popular demand exists for the establishment of a hemispheric league, confederation, or federation.

It is not a common danger but a common feeling of danger that unites peoples. The common danger from Europe and Asia is not felt by all the American nations in the same degree or in the same way. Argentina and Chile are holding aloof in the present war.

2. The Pan American Union and the other inter-American agencies have been useful in many ways; but a condition of relative peace in the Western Hemisphere is to be attributed in the main to three conditions: (1) the overwhelming predominance of the United States; (2) Britain's sea-power; and (3) the general sparseness of population and lack of development in the Latin-American countries. Many boundary and other conflicts persist; and the general tendency is militaristic. The association of nations in this hemisphere has not operated as a security system. Continued leadership by the United States, joined with collective "followership" by the other American nations, may be sufficient to prevent wars from starting in this hemisphere; but, so far as world order or danger from without is concerned, little can be expected, except through measures applied to other continents or to the whole world.

3. To guarantee completely the security of the hemisphere without some form of assistance from the rest of the world would require a considerable permanent militarization, not only of the United States but also of the Latin-American nations. Such militarization would be unfavorable to democracy, peaceful inter-American relations, and economic progress. Regionalism, carried to an extreme, may easily become imperialism.

4. Trade conditions are exceptionally important in the political relationships of Latin-American countries. An attempt to make this hemisphere economically self-sufficient, however, would demand an extraordinary amount of planning in practically all of the 22 independent nations and a close co-ordination of their economies. Such an attempt would require in this country far-reaching and almost revolutionary changes in our agricultural system and policies, as well as in our economic relations with Europe and Asia. We cannot indefinitely buy the good will of Latin-American governments. Our present policy of "economic defense" resembles "dollar diplomacy" except that government bureaus have replaced private corporations, and the payments and receipts are in somewhat different terms. Government enterprise in Latin America will mean government monopolies, a repudiation of equal opportunity and the "open door."

IN EUROPE

Since the break-up of the Roman Empire, the idea of European union has persisted. The idea found partial

expression in the Holy Roman Empire and in the all-embracing influence of mediaeval catholicism. Napoleon attempted without success to unify Europe by



force. Hitler and his "New Order" harbor a similar aim and a similar doom. Concrete plans for a European league or federation have multiplied in recent years; and at the present time proposals for a European, as distinguished from a universal, peace system are receiving wide and serious consideration.

IT IS URGED for the following reasons that a European union of some kind is an essential step toward the establishment of world order.

1. From Europe radiate the political and economic influences that determine the destiny of other continents. At the present moment, the future of Latin

America and of Asia is being decided in Europe. Europe is also the world's cockpit. If conflict can be prevented there, world peace will be assured. European federation would automatically eliminate conflicts over boundaries, minorities, and economic rivalry.

2. A workable universal league will not be possible until the European hodgepodge of nations has been reduced to some degree of simplification and order. That this was the prior need is shown by the tendency of the League of Nations to become exclusively European.

3. The United States cannot or should not guarantee the peace of Europe, for one reason because Americans are incompetent to understand and solve peculiarly European problems. In the absence of such a guarantee, it is obviously necessary for Europeans to devise their own peace system; and the American government should encourage them to do so.

4. European unity is a fact. The chances are that after this war European nations will all be democratic in form, with much the same type of economy. Organized labor has long been an important unifying factor in Europe; and the probabilities are that in the future labor will be everywhere in power. The language differences in Europe will not interfere with the functioning of a federal government.

5. The problem of Europe begins with the problem of Germany. Peace in Europe requires that Germany be integrated into the European system. Only in that way can the aims of Germany be reconciled with the free-

dom of her neighbors. As Tad Lincoln said, when asked by his father what should be done with the Confederate leaders: "Let's not hang them. Let's hang on to them." We must not again let Germany loose. This time we must hang on to her.

6. Russia and Great Britain should be and can be included. Russian interests are more in Europe than in Asia. Britain looks as much to Europe as to her Empire and more to Europe than to America. Britain and Russia will prevent German domination of the European federation. If it is impossible to include Germany, a helpful beginning can be made with two federations, one in Western Europe and one in Eastern Europe. The former would include Britain and the latter Russia.

IT IS DENIED, as we may note below, that European regional organization has any significant relation to the problem of world order.

1. Europe is merely a geographical expression. It is not a continent, not even a separate land-mass. It is a part of Eurasia. Colonial possessions join Africa, as well as Asia, to Europe. Russia is both European and Asiatic. Britain belongs to the world as well as to Europe. All that part of Asia known as the Near East or Middle East could not logically be excluded from a European system.

2. Even within the boundaries of what is called Europe, seas, bays, and mountain ranges create a dozen or more minor regions and suggest geographical disunity.

3. Racially, economically, and culturally, Europe is characterized by diversity, rather than unity. Politically, it has been divided into two hostile and irreconcilable camps; and it is unlikely that the war will make all Europe truly democratic. Democracy, like beauty, is more than skin-deep. The communist bugaboo will remain. Nationalism may be stronger. Neighboring nations are farther apart than before the war. Hatred of the Germans is such that their close association with other peoples will be unthinkable for many years.

4. It is quite true that in Germany lies the key to the European problem. Certain limited federations, exclusive of Germany, might be constructed. The result would be fewer and bigger powers; but no assurance of peace. On the other hand, neither Russia nor Great Britain can be included in a European union. Russia is already a vast regional federation, continental in scope, and nationalist, not internationalist. Her interests in Europe go no farther than Pan-Slavism. Britain, looking in the opposite direction, has washed her hands of Eastern Europe. The Dominions do not belong in a European union; and Britain will not cut loose from them. If Russia and Britain are excluded from the European organization and Germany is included, Germany will dominate Europe as Prussia dominates Germany. Such a union might militarize the whole of Europe. Prior to their own federation the German states other than Prussia were pacific and liberal; but afterwards they became warlike and illiberal. If Eastern Europe were united under Russia, while Western Eu-

rope federated with Britain, we should be giving Germany an admirable opportunity to play the balance-of-power game.

5. Quite prominent in the Pan-European movement have been signs of jealousy of other continents and of a desire to restore European leadership. A European union with such motivations would contribute little to intercontinental security.

IN ASIA

This war, by ending Nippon's dream of ascendancy, should eliminate her type of regional organization. In other respects, too, the situation in Asia (including the southwest Pacific and the Indian Ocean) will be greatly changed when the war is over. It is quite certain that the Western powers will never again play in this part of the world the dominating role that was theirs during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For many years nationalism has been growing throughout the Orient. From the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1904-05, Western powers have been losing prestige; and what they had left has been seriously undermined by Japanese victories in the present war. Old-fashioned European imperialism cannot be revived. European colonies must either be abandoned or administered with a view to early independence. Sooner or later, the vast area that we are now discussing may include almost a score of independent nations—Japan, China, Russia, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, the Indies, Australia, New Zealand, Burma, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria,

Palestine, Saudi-Arabia, and Turkey. Can such a line-up of nations establish and maintain a co-operative system capable of ensuring peace?

ON ONE SIDE, reasons are found for a favorable view of the chances for Asiatic and Pacific regionalism.

1. The countries mentioned, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand, may not be racially and culturally homogeneous but they are differentiated from the West by that way of life and thought which is summed up in the word "Oriental." Considerable truth lies in Kipling's lines: "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." With the exception of Japan, all Oriental peoples have had in common the feeling of being "oppressed," also the consciousness of self-sufficiency. It is only a hundred years since the Far East came out from almost complete isolation.

2. With the exception of the Japanese, all Oriental peoples are normally disposed to peace, partly because of their social organization and partly because they are living in an undeveloped region.

3. China, with its vast population, will emerge from the war the leading Oriental power. Russia and India will co-operate with her, producing a clear preponderance of power. It is not unlikely that the Near Eastern countries, including Egypt and Turkey, may take steps to perfect an Islamic association.

ON THE OTHER SIDE, doubts are expressed regarding the possibility of any useful organization of nations in the East.

1. No basic regional unity exists. Asia comprises one-third of the land surface of the globe, and includes four regions of continental proportions—West Asia or the



Near East, Siberia, India, and China. In addition, we have the vast island archipelagoes. Asia shows more racial and cultural differences than does Europe. Religion is a strong divisive factor. Unlike Europe, Asia has never had the fact or the ideal of union. Adequate internal communications are lacking.

2. In some Asiatic nations, unity and stability are not yet assured. Though China has made rapid strides politically and socially, it remains to be seen whether she can maintain cohesion and internal order. India is a conglomerate, characterized more by conflict than by harmony. For her, federation is a baffling problem; and independence would be a major hazard. Similar doubts crop out as we pass on to Burma, the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippines. Without assured maturity and

stability in their national affairs, how can they co-operate to organize and run a third of the world?

3. An Asiatic association, if it could be achieved, would present the gravest of dangers. The Japanese have shown that Orientals are not necessarily peace loving. Industrialized, possessing the essentials of military power, impelled by population pressure, taking on a "have not" psychology, and racially self-conscious, an Asiatic union might be an overwhelming menace to the western world.

4. The probabilities are that Asia within the calculable future will be able neither to achieve continental union nor to dispense with the West. The Asiatic peoples, though politically independent, will continue as a whole to belong to the European-American system. Current thinking and future prospects do not indicate that any peculiarly regional developments in Asia will substantially contribute to world order. Asia, better than any other continent, illustrates the universality of the peace problem.

Chapter V

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

At the close of the First World War, the victorious nations drew up the Covenant of the League of Nations. Established as a new international organization in 1919, the League is still technically in existence; but it is in a state of suspended animation and, for that reason, will here be referred to in the past tense. The proposal to be debated in this chapter is for a revival of the League with no essential change in its purpose, structure, or function. Before proceeding with the arguments, it will be necessary to have clearly in mind the League's characteristic features as originally planned and provided for in the Covenant.

The proposals discussed in previous chapters have one thing in common: they are limited in scope. None of them contemplates a universal organization or association. In contrast, the League of Nations, when established in 1919, was expected to include all or nearly all nations in its membership. This expectation was never fulfilled; but we shall assume in the present discussion that, if the League is revived, its membership will be relatively universal from the beginning, including all the great powers, victors and vanquished alike, along with most of the small nations.

The organization provided for in the Covenant was a very loose confederation with an Assembly, a Council, and a permanent Secretariat. It represented govern-

ments, not peoples. The member states were treated as equals, each having one vote in the Assembly. In most matters, the Assembly or the Council could come to a decision only by unanimous vote. The Council departed somewhat from the principles of equality and unanimity, since its membership was limited to certain great powers, which were permanent members, along with a few other states selected from time to time by the Assembly. Nevertheless, any nation belonging to the League was entitled to send a representative to sit as a member of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of such nation.

The League as a system of collective security rested on a broad mutual guarantee "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League." In case of any aggression or "any threat or danger of such aggression," the Council was to advise upon the means of fulfilling this undertaking.

Certain provisions, however, seemed to offer opportunity for peaceful change. Both the Assembly and the Council were authorized to deal with "any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world." It was declared to be "the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." The Assembly was authorized to "advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties

which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world."



More specific provision was made for the settlement of disputes. The members of the League agreed that any dispute between them likely to lead to a rupture would be submitted either to arbitration¹ or to enquiry by the Council; and they further pledged themselves "in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators² or the report by the Council." They agreed to carry out in good faith any judgment that might be rendered and not to make war against any member complying with such judgment. In case of nonexecution, the Council was to propose what steps should be taken to give effect to the judgment. The Permanent Court of International Justice, later established under the Covenant, was empowered to give advisory opinions on matters referred to it by the Council or the Assembly.

¹ Amended to add this phrase: "or judicial settlement."

² Amended to add this phrase: "or the judicial decision."

Provision was therefore made for political, as well as for judicial, settlement. Serious disputes not submitted to arbitration were to be laid before the Council. If this body failed to settle the dispute, it was to make and publish a report of the facts and its recommendations; but, if the dispute referred to a matter within the "domestic jurisdiction" of one of the parties, no recommendation should be made by the Council. In case a report was unanimously agreed to by the members of the Council (other than the representatives of the parties to the dispute) all members of the League were obligated "not to go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report." If the report was not unanimous, the members could take whatever action they might "consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice."

It was foreseen that a member of the League might resort to war without fulfilling the obligations just mentioned. Such member, the Covenant says, "shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League." The latter were thereupon obligated to subject the offending state immediately to certain nonmilitary sanctions or means of coercion, chiefly of an economic, financial, and commercial nature, amounting in effect to a nonbelligerent blockade of the lawbreaker. In addition, the Council was to recommend "what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League." Each member-state bound itself to help in the application of economic and finan-

cial sanctions and in resistance to counter-measures by the covenant-breaking nation, and to give passage through its territory to the forces of the co-operating members. Finally, a violator of the Covenant could be expelled from the League.

Provision was made for handling disputes involving nonmembers. These were to be invited to accept the obligations of membership with reference to the dispute. In case of refusal, the nonmember, if in dispute with a member, became subject to the economic, financial, and military measures just described; but, if the dispute was between two nonmembers and both refused, the Council could adopt whatever measures and recommendations might be appropriate to prevent hostilities and terminate the dispute.

Finally, the Covenant declared that any war or threat of war is "a matter of concern to the whole League," which "shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations."

While the League was intended to be universal, it was provided that nothing in the Covenant should "affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

With reference to disarmament, the Covenant recognized that "the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." The Council was charged with formulating plans for such reduc-

tion; and, after adoption of the plans, no government could exceed the limits fixed without the concurrence of the Council. "Grave objections" were seen to the private manufacture of munitions; and the Council was to "advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented." The members of the League undertook to interchange full and frank information on armaments, military programs, and industries adaptable to war purposes.

In addition to these features of the League as a peace instrument, the Covenant established the mandate-system of colonial administration, set forth principles regarding labor, assigned social welfare activities to the League, adopted something like the principle of equality of economic opportunity, and made provision for putting under the League's direction various international bureaus and commissions.

Obviously, the nations of the world, during the twenty years of the League's active life, did not inaugurate a regime of peaceful change, settle all disputes by peaceful methods, establish security, bring about disarmament, or prevent all wars. It may be conceded that the general effort to maintain peace was a tragic failure. But whether the League was impractical, defective, or otherwise at fault is another question and one that is answered in different ways.

ACCEPTANCE of the League of Nations as the world's best hope for the future might be based on the following argument.

1. The League of Nations had its roots in past ex-

perience. The Covenant embodied those ideas and practices in the international sphere, which during the nineteenth century had come into being and had been generally accepted as wise, moral, and constructive. These had been supported and many of them initiated or exemplified by the United States. The founders of the League rejected such discredited alternatives as isolationism, imperialism, alliances, and balances of power; and they likewise stopped far short of world federation or a supergovernment. The League was a new combination of familiar parts. It enlisted the understanding and support of the public opinion of the time, appealing generally to the leaders of public thought and also to the masses. After 1920, the League was misunderstood in this country; and later in Europe it was systematically misrepresented and undermined by Hitler and Mussolini. Nevertheless, the United States did not repudiate the main principles of the League; for these were traditionally American.

2. While the League was rudimentary, it was expected to grow and was so framed as to permit evolution and adaptation. It was, as Wilson termed it, "a vehicle of life." The most practical course of action at the end of this war will be to launch the League again under more promising auspices. Later, we may wish to make changes in the Covenant. Many alterations were proposed and thoroughly studied during the League's active life; and it is always easier to revise what has already been adopted and is understood than to create something entirely new. In Europe habits and loyalties have formed around the League; and the League has

more symbolic value now than ever before, because its dictatorial arch-enemies are now discredited. The League organization will be better adapted to the work of postwar reconstruction than would be the war agencies of the United Nations.

It is possible that those who now advocate the League will be denounced, as Woodrow Wilson was, for being "idealistic," "visionary," and "Utopian." If so, it may be well to compare the idealism and far-sighted vision of Wilson with, for example, the so-called and once-boasted "realism" of Mussolini. Hitler and the Japanese war-lords have also prided themselves on being "realists"; but, as we are now in process of proving, their schemes and methods have been shot through with illusion, delusion, and sheer blundering.

3. The machinery of the League was well adapted to its purposes and principles. It constituted, not a government, but an organization through which governments could act collectively and co-operatively. The Versailles Conference assumed that the world was not ready for a superstate. Nationalism and national sovereignty could not yet be eliminated or even greatly reduced. The League was, therefore, based on a treaty, not on a constitution; and it took the form of a confederation of governments, in which were applied, in a flexible manner, the three principles of sovereignty, equality, and unanimity.

The League possessed in embryo legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative departments.

Legislation took the form of peaceful change and settlement of disputes. Provision was properly made

for political as well as judicial deliberation and action. The following opinion has been stated with considerable authority: "Clearly the international society with the greatest chance of success will be that one which will assure a dynamic peace with the minimum sacrifice of national sovereignty."³ Did not the League Covenant provide for that kind of a society?

4. The principle of universal membership embodied in the League was and is sound. A universal or relatively universal association is the only one able to bring to bear an overwhelming preponderance of power against an aggressor.

To operate as a system of collective security, an international organization must include the countries that are potential enemies. Accordingly, if any of the great powers are left out, the way is open for hostile alignments and undermining campaigns from the outside.

Two restricted conceptions of the League were wisely rejected by its founders. One was that it should be purely a concert of free peoples. In a federation, autocracies and democracies might make strange bedfellows; but in a loose confederation having the single purpose of maintaining order it is possible for all forms of government to co-operate. Ideological similarity may be desirable, but it is not indispensable. The second restricted conception was that the League should comprise only the great powers. While small nations might be omitted from the standpoint of military power, their

³ Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, "Preliminary Report and Monographs," *International Conciliation* (April 1941), No. 369, p. 200.

inclusion is essential from other standpoints. They are most devoted to the principle of collective security; they are involved in the beginnings of war; they need to be heard; their statesmen are worth hearing; and the principle of democracy demands that they be represented.

In general, the League was adapted to an interdependent world, in which the processes of peace must be no less universal in scope than the impact of war.

5. While membership was to be universal, the principles of the League permitted regional arrangements. In fact, these were recognized and encouraged by the terms of the Covenant and by League practice. In addition, there was an appropriate concentration of authority and responsibility in the hands of the great powers, not merely because of the setup of the Council but more for the reason that weak countries naturally follow the leadership of the strong.

6. Circumstances that will not be repeated after this war prevented the League in actual operation from achieving even a relatively universal membership, and failure in this respect produced fatal weakness. The absence of certain great powers contributed to the feeling of insecurity, led to rearmament, and encouraged the return to alliances and balance-of-power policies. Because the League was a confederation, its most important organs were the member-nations; and the actual structure, functioning, and effectiveness of the League were determined in large measure by how many and what nations were inside or outside.

If Germany, Russia, and the United States had been in from the beginning, the story of the League and of

Europe would have been very different. Germany was a member only from 1926 to 1935 and Russia only from 1934 to 1939. During the first six years, when the League was getting its start, neither of these great powers was a member. Disarmament of Germany and refusal to give her the protection of League membership presented that key-power with a grievance, a reason for feeling insecure, and an excuse for rearming. Lacking universality, the general tendency was for the League to become merely one combination ranged against another.

The unexpected absence of the United States altered the character of the League and substantially contributed to its final collapse. The Versailles Treaty was shaped in the belief that the United States would stand behind it. The Covenant was peculiarly an Anglo-American product. America's refusal to ratify it destroyed three possibilities: (1) of uninhibited American leadership, (2) of Anglo-American predominance, and (3) of Anglo-American co-operation. In the absence of the United States, League leadership was left to Great Britain and France; and Britain's attitude toward Germany was in the main conciliatory, while that of France was in the main repressive. On some vital matters, the two countries worked at cross-purposes.

It will be recalled that a Tri-Partite Treaty of Mutual Guarantee was concluded at Paris between Great Britain, France, and the United States. Had this Treaty been ratified by the United States, France would have had reason to feel secure. Had the power and popularity of this country been added to the League, other nations,

too, would have felt safe. Under these circumstances, France would not have proceeded at once to encircle Germany with alliances; and Germany would have had more reason to feel secure. In such a situation, disarmament would have been possible, reducing the likelihood of aggression and making easier the application of sanctions.

The record suggests that the system of sanctions would have succeeded with American participation and Anglo-American co-operation. In the Far East, such co-operation was foreshadowed by the Washington Conference (1922); but in the case of Manchuria (1931), the United States and Britain, without the habits and common obligations that the League would have supplied, were unable to put effective pressure on Japan. In the case of Ethiopia (1935) non-military sanctions were belatedly and half-heartedly applied to Italy; and their failure is largely to be attributed to the non-co-operation of the United States. In the case of Spain (1937), a number of factors permitted Mussolini and Hitler to have their way; but not the least of them was the lack of understanding and co-ordination between the United States, Britain, France, and Russia.

7. After this war, the international association will not be identified with an unpopular peace treaty. The League was seriously handicapped by the fact that it was intertwined with the Versailles peace. The League was charged with the carrying out of numerous Treaty provisions. Treaty and Covenant were in some respects contradictory. For example, the doctrine of self-determination embodied in the Treaty encouraged a

highly disintegrating kind of nationalism, broke down the Austro-Hungarian Empire, increased the number of small nations, and multiplied points of friction and sources of conflict. Self-determination and nationalistic autonomy were safe and practicable only after an effective League had been established. In general, the League suffered from its association with the treaty.

8. The ideological differences that hampered the League will be absent or greatly mitigated after this war. The menace of revolutionary communism has been removed by a movement of capitalism toward communism and of communism toward capitalism, as well as by Russia's part in this war. Postwar national economies will be mixed systems, including elements of both freedom and control. Class privilege will have largely vanished. In the political sphere, the struggle will be decided in favor of democracy. Faith in popular government will have been renewed.

9. Economic conditions will also be more favorable. The turn in the fortunes of Germany and of the League came with the depression of 1929. Had the German people possessed a reasonable degree of economic, along with international security, the Republic would have been saved and with it German support of the peace structure.

10. Peoples and governments will now have the will needed to make the League work. The system set up at Geneva would have succeeded if that will had existed. The League itself was merely structure and machinery. Its motive and directive force had to come chiefly from the governments of the great powers. Nothing was

wrong with the League itself. German and Italian efforts against it proved that they feared it. As members, Italy and Japan were insincere. Germany and Russia were in and out. Great Britain and France were lacking in faith and determination.

Peace in accordance with the Covenant was not the aim of all governments. In this situation, the democracies, when they should have acted at the risk of war, were paralyzed by their own pacifism. Thus, they encouraged aggression. Now, they have finally learned that appeasement is not the way to peace, and that the real risk comes from inaction, not action. In the future, we shall know much better how and when to act; and we shall prefer collective action to being destroyed one by one. Britain and France were primarily interested in preserving the existing order. They were not actively concerned with peaceful change or with the removal of causes of conflict. In the future, a different attitude may be expected, especially when the more flexible and detached American viewpoint becomes influential. The conservative and nationalist elements that distrusted and opposed the League will be weaker in all countries after this war.

It may be expected, furthermore, that peace organizations in the different countries will supply the people with real leadership. They will no longer be divided between pro-Leaguers and anti-Leaguers.

11. In spite of everything, the League came within an ace of permanent success. Before 1926, it really helped to keep the peace. Had there been a different turn of events after 1931, the League might have had

time to consolidate both its strength and prestige. Thereafter, neither would have been challenged again. Even as late as the middle thirties, a strong stand against Italy and Japan might have put a stop to both Fascism and aggression. At the very worst, the League lost by a narrow squeak; and it has earned a second trial under fairer conditions.

12. Some believe that the League can win the attachment of peoples only by dispensing benefits, by having positive economic and social functions, or by assuming administrative responsibilities, for example, over colonies. Friends of the League have no quarrel with such suggestions, provided they do not divert attention from the primary purpose of keeping international order. The League as originally conceived was in no way inconsistent with economic progress and social justice.

REJECTION of the League as a means of maintaining world order might rest on the arguments sketched below.

1. The League of Nations was an unrealistic conception in the first place, since it assumed a morality, an interest in peace, and an understanding of peace that governments did not have. It was the result of an abnormal situation and was accepted by the Paris Conference largely because of Woodrow Wilson's persistence and because of Clemenceau's hope that French security would be guaranteed by Great Britain and the United States.

The League, it is true, was misrepresented and undermined; it had hard luck, but it would have failed

anyway. It went either too far or not far enough. No intermediate position can be taken between anarchy and government.

2. It is possible that after this war the League might be better understood and supported by public opinion; but no great change can be expected in feelings and attitudes unless or until a real change is made in world organization. So long as nations remain independent and sovereign, men will feel and function nationally, not internationally. To catch the imagination and win the loyalty of peoples, the League must be as revolutionary in constitution and in action as it was in theory. Unfortunately, some of the psychological factors may now be changing for the worse. In some quarters, the feeling of nationalism may be growing stronger. Why should the spirit of appeasement be any weaker? As a matter of fact, the League itself, instead of stimulating internationalism, accentuated nationalism (1) by continually emphasizing the independence and equality of nations, and (2) by making governments more "touchy."

3. Since the League's basic and determining principle was that each nation remained independent and sovereign, Geneva became merely a front for the old nationalistic power-system. The League functioned as a meeting of diplomats. Neither the Assembly nor the Council had any real authority or initiative. Decisions were made "backstage" by the old-fashioned process of bargaining. In the major and critical matters, action depended almost wholly on the position taken by the great powers. Accordingly, what went on in the League was not very different from what went on outside it.

What the League accomplished could have been accomplished by ordinary diplomatic negotiations or conferences.

4. Since the League made no essential change in the international system, the natural tendency was for it to become a combination of members facing a hostile combination of nonmembers. Thus, the League became in the end nothing much but an association of peace-loving "have" nations, with practically all the warlike "have-not" nations on the outside. Under the circumstances, the association could have maintained peace only by recognizing the requirements of a balance-of-power system and developing aggressive policies in the interest of defense, that is, by becoming an armed alliance or federation with a single diplomatic and military command.

5. The League could not ensure peace because it left untouched the root-cause of war. For this reason, the new organization did not bring security; and without security nations would not disarm.

It was necessary for the success of the League that it should give security to both France and Germany. At the very beginning France proceeded to build up a system of alliances. It is true that she might not have done so if she had had the guarantees from Britain and America provided in the unratified Tri-Partite Treaty; but that such a treaty appeared necessary proves the inadequacy of the League. In the Locarno Pact (1925) Great Britain and Italy joined in a four-power renunciation of war and in a guarantee of the Rhine Frontier. This treaty introduced a measure of security and stability in the

relations of Germany and France; but the "spirit of Locarno" had little relation to the League Covenant, except to demonstrate the latter's futility.

Aside from French policy and general economic conditions, the most important factors in the security of Germany were general disarmament and peaceful change. Germany had been disarmed; but, since the League failed to provide security, Britain and France had not kept their implied promise to disarm.

The League left the solution of domestic problems to the individual states, disregarding the fact that most wars are caused by conditions or policies that can be construed as "domestic."

6. The League came near enough to universal membership to demonstrate that such a principle is unworkable in connection with the other principles on which the League was based. A unanimous agreement is often possible among a few powers. It becomes extremely difficult or impossible when the parties are numerous, are widely separated geographically, and possess divergent interests. In the settlement of European questions, Siam, Persia, or Haiti had the same voting power as Great Britain or France and in many important cases could veto a proposal approved by *all* the other nations. In practice, near-universality, along with unanimity, produced delay and paralysis.

The fact that modern wars tend to be world wars does not prove that all nations are equally involved in the causing of war or that a system of preventing war should be universal.

The Covenant contains a vague recognition of region-

alism; but no machinery was set up to decentralize decisions or action, or could be set up without a radical alteration of the League. On the other hand, in its actual functioning the League tended to break up into regional blocs.

7. Much of the time and energy of those who gathered at Geneva went to the discussion of ways to strengthen the League; for neither its constitution nor its machinery was well adapted to the purpose of maintaining peace. The whole structure rested on a shifting contractual foundation. Some provisions of the Covenant were so vague as to have little specific meaning. Functions appeared only in a shadowy form. The major organs of the League had no life or power of their own. Certain serious deficiencies proved impossible to correct; for example, the failure to provide for compulsory arbitration, the lack of a definition of aggression, and the fact that war under certain circumstances was recognized as legal.

8. The League in Woodrow Wilson's mind was a democratic conception; but the men who represented their governments at Geneva were in most cases not popularly elected and could not speak for the groups whose pressures gave life and meaning to the domestic policies of the democracies. Since the League statesmen were not accountable to the people for their actions at Geneva, it was not possible to subject the League to control by public opinion or to create the public opinion necessary for control.

9. Peaceful change is the function of legislation; but the League retarded, rather than promoted, peaceful

change. The mandate system did provide for adjustments in a few backward areas; but, in general, the mutual guarantee of independence and territorial integrity and the exclusion of domestic affairs from the jurisdiction of the League tended to freeze the international situation as of 1919. Since the Covenant was chiefly concerned with preventing war, its purposes were to be achieved in the main by repression. A dynamic peace, on the contrary, implies a continuous process of liberation, of relieving tension and pressure by adjustments, in a manner similar to the legislative process in domestic affairs. Furthermore, the Covenant embodied an inadequate view of the meaning of international disputes. If no dispute is dealt with until it threatens war, the difficulty of settling it becomes well-nigh insurmountable. In international as in domestic affairs, differences must be removed or compromised in the early stages before they arouse emotions and become irreconcilable.

The setting up of a new system of negotiation at Geneva and a supposedly complete plan of international control made it more difficult to adapt procedures to special and limited situations.

The Covenant provided a means to revise treaties and to bring up for discussion any condition in the world that might lead to war. But how in an assembly of diplomats representing proud and sensitive sovereignties could such subjects be discussed?

10. Judicially, the system was inadequate. It is true that, in international as in domestic affairs, the most serious conflicts are political rather than legal, and they

call for settlement by the political organ—the legislature. Nevertheless, it is possible for courts, in deciding disputes brought before them, to make adjustments in human relations and within limits to develop law. The establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice was a real advance; but the Covenant did not compel the submission of all disputes to arbitral or judicial settlement; and the Permanent Court of International Justice is not a court of equity and does not decide political questions. International law, therefore, is left in a static condition.

11. On its executive side, the deficiencies of the League were demonstrated by the failure of sanctions.

The major and critical aggressions were by Japan in Manchuria (1931), Italy in Ethiopia (1935), Germany in the Rhineland (1936), and Germany and Italy in Spain (1936-37). The failure of the League in these cases was good evidence of its impotence; and Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese war-lords were accordingly encouraged to proceed with their plans for further and greater aggressions.

The failure of sanctions may be attributed in part to the prior failure of disarmament and perhaps also to the difficulty of defining aggression and recognizing the aggressor. But the real reason for the breakdown of the League's executive power lay in the fact that Britain and France, the nations that bore the primary responsibility, were acting as independent powers, independent of the League and independent of each other. They consulted their special and separate interests. They were not always in agreement. Each vacillated and procrastinated.

minated. They were told that sanctions meant war; and one or the other or both shrank from war. The League had no will of its own. For means of coercion it had to depend on the member-states. It had no military or economic general staff and no plans. Sanctions have their inherent limitations and difficulties; but these were not the determining factors. The real trouble was the lack of will and singleness of purpose.

How can we say that the League "almost" succeeded? It is idle to speculate on "what might have been." As a matter of fact, before 1926, when the League is supposed to have been at the peak of its power, Poland had seized Vilna with impunity and Italy had bombarded Corfu.

12. The League might well be preserved, but not as an instrument for maintaining peace. Stripped of its political functions, the League can be put to good use as a reconstruction agency after this war, as an international research institution and clearing-house, as an administrative organization, or as a means of economic and social co-operation. It must not be thought, however, that expanding or strengthening the League along these lines would materially improve its prospects or effectiveness in the field of policing. To keep order one must govern; and the League of Nations was not a government.

Chapter VI

A "STRONGER" ASSOCIATION

Between a loose confederation, such as the League, and a world-state, which we do not discuss, many forms of international organization are conceivable. Those who explore these possibilities hope to find a type of association that will be acceptable to the public and at the same time "stronger" than the League.

In such an association, it may be assumed, provision would be made for real, though limited, legislative, judicial, and executive powers, and for their positive effective exercise. Legislation would be effected by majority vote in the assembly and the council. National representatives in the assembly would be chosen by the various national legislatures. The council would be restricted to persons appointed by the executive departments of the great powers. Thus, universality would be retained; equality and unanimity discarded; and representation furthered. Submission of disputes either to arbitration or to political settlement would be compulsory; and nations would bind themselves to accept the award or decision. The executive function would be exercised by the council.

The council would not have power, independently of the member nations, to maintain an armed force or to initiate military measures. Nevertheless, the "strengthened" association would be capable of more effective military action than was the League. The council would

have its own general staff, which would prepare plans for the application of coercive measures. National armaments would be drastically reduced, being fixed by two sets of requirements: those of internal policing and those of international peace and order. The small nations would be restricted to their needs for internal policing. The great powers, in addition, would be permitted and obligated to raise and equip a part of the collective military force. Each of the national contingents would be subject at any time to call by the council. The latter would presumably be authorized, in any case of international disorder or threatened disorder, to delegate the task of keeping the peace to one or more of the nations directly interested. In the Western Hemisphere, for example, the United States, acting with and through its inter-American system, would always bear the primary responsibility. The international force might be mustered, when necessary, for the execution of arbitral awards and judicial decisions.¹

To prevent national rearmament beyond the limits fixed by the council, the latter would be empowered to license the manufacture of and trade in arms, munitions, and military supplies. In addition, the council would have the right to make inspections and arrests. War as an instrument of national policy would be prohibited.

This association would rest on a contractual rather

¹ One alternative to the proposed setup has in view a complete international military establishment created, supported, and exclusively controlled by the international authority. Such a plan, if adopted, would in effect establish a world state. It is, therefore, beyond the scope of the present discussion.

than a constitutional basis; but its establishment might require the amendment of some national constitutions including our own. It is not proposed to discard all



provisions of the League Covenant. Most of them, with some revision, could be included in the new pact.

PROPOSERS of this stronger type of international association might bring the following propositions to its support.

1. Compared with the loose League of Nations, this proposed organization is much tighter and rests on clearer contractual obligations. It involves, however, neither an outright repudiation nor a blanket endorsement of the League.

2. The proposed organization recognizes the essential role of force in the preservation of peace and limits national sovereignty to the greatest extent now practicable. At the same time, the plan intentionally falls short of a world state or supergovernment.

In a recent address, Dr. Hu Shih, the former Chinese Ambassador, referred to

... the deep-rooted prejudice against the use of "force" as the necessary element for the enforcement of peace and order. Because in a civilized society the actual resort to force is reduced to a minimum, the peace-loving and law-abiding citizens tend to lose sight of the important role of force in the maintenance of peace and order. They tend to forget that law, order and peace do not mean the absence of force, but, on the contrary, are always dependent upon some form of effectively organized power for their enforcement against possible violation by determined gangsters.

3. The idea of an international military organization has received many reputable endorsements. In this respect the year 1910 is notable. In May of that year, Theodore Roosevelt in his Nobel address advocated an international league, which should enforce peace, if necessary by military action. In June, the Congress of the United States passed and President Taft signed a resolution proposing to set up a commission to consider the expediency of disarmament and "of constituting the combined navies of the world an international force for the preservation of international peace." In September, a Dutch professor, van Vollenhoven, argued for an international navy to enforce arbitral awards and protect neutral rights. At the close of the First World War, the French proposal for a league of nations provided for an international general staff with powers of inspection and an international army composed of national contingents. At the present time, the idea has fairly wide support in both Great Britain and the United States. In their agreement on January 23, 1942, the Polish and

Czechoslovak governments in exile agreed that the confederation to be formed by the two countries will have a common general staff and in the event of war a unified supreme command.

4. On various occasions an international force of one sort or another has come into being. International police have functioned in various parts of the world; for example, in the international concessions in China and at Tangier. An international army operated in China at the time of the Boxer uprising in 1900. In the form of coalitions and alliances, military co-operation among nations has frequently been achieved, as in the Napoleonic Wars and the First and Second World Wars. After the First World War, interallied troops were used in the occupation of Germany and other areas. For the settlement of the Vilna dispute between Poland and Lithuania in 1920, the League of Nations took steps to organize an international force; and several countries expressed their willingness to contribute contingents. The plan came to an end when Switzerland refused to permit passage through her territory. The present war-time pooling of resources and of authority is especially significant because it is expected to continue during the armistice period and because at the end of that period the world will be at least half disarmed. It should be the less difficult, therefore, for the United States, Britain, Russia, and China to reduce their military establishments and to provide for their future co-operation in an international military force. To this arrangement, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan could be later admitted. Thus, a way is open for the smooth

evolution of a really effective international association.

5. This association will have better means than the League of Nations to represent and create public opinion and to enlist the interest and loyalty of peoples. It will not be practicable for members of the assembly to be popularly chosen; but election by the national legislatures will bring the assembly closer to the parties and pressure groups that are represented in the legislatures. The assembly will thus become less diplomatic and more popular.

Through licensing and inspection, contact will be established between the international executive and the individual citizens and corporations of the various states. Branch offices will be located in the principal industrial areas. People will become habituated to international control.

6. The plan provides so far as may be practicable for a complete and self-acting system. The functions necessary to the maintenance of peace are so related that all must be effectively performed or none of them will be. By discarding the principles of equality and unanimity and by making the assembly more representative, a better chance is offered for international legislation, for the rounding out of the legal order, and for peaceful change. Compulsory judicial settlement of disputes supplies another essential. An executive equipped to decide and to act fulfills a further indispensable condition. These features, following an armistice dictated by nations that are opposed to militarism, will ensure the requisite limitation of armaments and thus further facilitate the task of keeping order. The League of Nations

proved that preparation for aggression cannot be stopped by an international debating society composed of pacifist governments.

7. Equipped for prompt and effective action, this association would be formidable enough to deter any potential aggressor. If aggression started, the only obstacle to action would lie in the possibility that the member states might again lack the necessary will, fail to honor their obligations, and refuse to supply their contingents. But this time, it may be confidently expected, neither the public nor governments will forget that force must be unhesitatingly met by force. If this association accepts its first challenge, it is not likely to be challenged again or, if challenged, to be found wanting. Courage comes with proved strength.

8. The plan provides an internally consistent and reasonably adequate method of employing collective power for the prevention of war.

Since war is the ultimate and perfect expression of unlimited national sovereignty, war must be completely outlawed. In the international sphere, only collective authority can be permitted to use force; and it must be used in the international as in the domestic sphere whenever and wherever disorder appears. In practice, the guilty can be detected without great difficulty. The idea will be to eliminate a threat of war at the outset, in the way a fire department puts out a fire. This proposal does not exclude economic and financial sanctions but holds that they cannot supersede or even precede the employment of armed force. We avoid the term "international police" because to many persons it sug-

gests a regular system of patrolling, the permanent occupation of foreign countries, continual interference in other people's affairs, and keeping American troops in Europe and Asia. The proposal under discussion requires none of these things.

9. The role to be played by the great powers in this plan will contribute strength and decisiveness while respecting the principles of democracy to the extent that these principles can be applied to an international system. An international organization cannot yet be constructed on the same basis as a national organization. States are different from individuals; and the relations of states are different from the relations of individuals. An international organization must reflect the actual distribution of power. In this respect, the claims of the small nations are practically negligible.

Various schemes have been offered for the purpose of making an international assembly proportionally or fairly representative. In any national representative body, however, the nominal or constitutional plan of representation usually bears little resemblance to the actual distribution of leadership and influence. It will be the same in an international body. So in our organization we may permit the small states, for their own reassurance, to form a majority in the assembly, while the great powers control the council; and we may rely with confidence on the leadership and influence of the great powers to prevent a deadlock on any vital question.

OPPONENTS of the "stronger" association outlined at the beginning of this chapter may have something like this to say against the plan:

1. For the purpose of maintaining peace, the proposed organization would actually be no "stronger" than the League of Nations. The League had power enough at its disposal. It always possessed military preponderance. The Covenant did not prohibit or prevent the mobilization of an international force; and, on occasion, such a force would doubtless have been created and employed, if the necessary will had been in existence.

2. The problems of an international force are political as well as technical. The proposed association would be another framework for back-stage bargaining, balances of power, and imperialisms; but a definite risk lies in the possibility that its military functions may be manipulated in the interest of some dictatorial power like Germany or Japan or a combination of such powers.

3. What nations will make up this tremendously powerful council? Presumably, the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, France, Italy, China, and Japan. If France should join Germany, Italy, and Japan, the Council would be evenly divided; but, if Russia also should join the former Axis powers, the United States, Great Britain, and China would be in the minority. If, now, Japan should pick a quarrel with the United States, our position, with the united forces of the world moving against us, would be an extremely uncomfortable one. Do Americans relish the idea of being left disarmed and helpless at the mercy of another and cleverer Hitler who has learned how to pull the wires and wear the camouflage of this confederation?

4. Since nations may withdraw from this association, universal membership might be quite as much of a

mirage as it was in the case of the League. The new league, like the old, would tend to become one of two hostile combinations.

5. A confederation has never worked efficiently. In America, the Articles of Confederation were unsatisfactory. The German Confederation between 1815 and 1867 proved weak. Since the association, presumably, will have no power to lay and collect taxes, it can be readily starved to death. The organization would not generate a worldwide popular loyalty. Policemen and inspectors are rarely loved. Since its power is susceptible of abuse, the organization would not create a general sense of security.

6. Without having guaranteed security, the association, like the League, would find limitation of armaments impossible. Assuming that a limitation on some basis were agreed to, it could not be enforced. International inspection is likely to be inadequate for financial, if not for political, reasons. Inspectors can be hoodwinked. They can also be bribed; and an inspection staff can be "packed." In any case, how can armaments be controlled without a broad control over industry and over trade in raw materials? Is any permanent reduction conceivable without elimination of militarism, militaristic classes, and the military bureaucracy, without a substantial curtailment of national sovereignty, without "moral disarmament" and profound psychological changes?

7. In the absence of real disarmament, the international force would have to be very large, its administration becoming complicated and its operations costly.

The technical and strategic questions involved are many, difficult, and without real precedent. If the confederation held command of the air, its task would be easier; but just what threats of international disorder can be handled by an air force? How would it act, for example, when aggression took the form of "fifth-column" subversion? Would international politics or international morals permit the bombing of cities for police purposes? If an air force alone were not sufficient, how effective would be an international army against, say, Great Britain? Russia? Or a modernized, powerful China?

8. The provisions for peaceful change, for legislation, arbitration, and judicial settlement are defective at many points. For example, to include the small nations in the assembly and to exclude them from the council would result at the best in protracted delays and at the worst in absolute paralysis. To take another example, if domestic questions are to be excepted from compulsory international settlement, how are such questions to be defined? Do they include immigration, tariffs, propaganda, etc.?

Chapter VII

A "COOLING-OFF" PERIOD?

We have thus far been debating the substance of things hoped for. We have asked, What is the solution of the problem? Now we ask, What procedure is most likely to result in a solution?

The following are examples of preliminary questions that will have to be answered: How can a government best prepare for the making of peace? Should preparatory research be carried on in the Department of State or, as during the First World War, by an outside group? What should be the composition of the American commission at the conference? Should the President head it, as Woodrow Wilson did in 1919? Because of the Senate's part in treaty making, should senators be included? Should members of the minority party be appointed to the commission? Should an advisory council be set up? How should the conference itself be organized and conducted? Should the treaty be dictated or negotiated; that is, should Axis representatives be excluded from the conference, as in 1919, or admitted? Where should the conference be held? Much may depend on the way these questions are answered; strategy and tactics may, conceivably, mean the winning or losing of the peace.

Two or three other matters should be kept in mind. At the close of the First World War, we had a Paris Conference, which produced the Treaty of Versailles. It has been proposed that this time we might do well

to dispense with the conference or the treaty or both. Those who hold such views appear to think that a system of world order will "evolve" during the war and the armistice period. The features and direction of this "growth" would evidently depend less on public discussion than on a series of executive and administrative decisions. The idea of "growth" or "evolution" has been referred to in previous chapters.¹ In the present connection, since the idea stresses executive power, it leads to certain constitutional questions: Must the final settlement be submitted to the Senate, where a two-thirds vote is necessary for ratification? Or can the President alone determine the nature of American participation in any future world order and commit this country to major international responsibilities?

The winning of the war will bring in its train three distinguishable acts: first, an armistice; second, an agreement on terms for the conclusion of the war; and, third, an effort to establish world order and durable peace. In the current discussion, proposals have been made that the third act should be postponed for two, three, or four years after the armistice, or, as a few writers imply, for an indefinite period. To be specific and not too extreme, let us consider the idea of postponing for three years after the armistice the final conference for the establishment of world order and durable peace.

FOR the postponement proposal, the following may be said:

¹ See pp. 10, 13, 45, 72-74.

1. In 1919 the Covenant of the League of Nations was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles and in consequence the League was weakened by its identification with an unpopular treaty. The identification came about partly because the Treaty and the Covenant were interwoven, but also partly because they were framed at the same time.

2. The governments that dominated the Peace Conference of 1919 also directed the work of reconstruction and relief. Attempting two tasks at the same time, they did neither well. At the end of this war, the job of relief and reconstruction will be far bigger than at the close of the former world conflict. Europe will be in worse turmoil, possibly in complete upheaval. Inevitably, therefore, economic and social reconstruction must come first in order to preserve those stable elements that will be essential to the construction of a new world order.

3. The popular psychology that is needed to win a war or is produced by a war is not the psychology required for constructive peace making. The successful prosecution of war calls for a united effort with a single thought and a single goal—victory. No time or energy is available for the proper study and discussion of peace plans. Nor is public controversy on any matter desirable in wartime.

4. In order to have the necessary fighting spirit, a people at war must be emotionally aroused and uplifted and it must hate its enemies. The feelings demanded and generated by war are incompatible with those required in a peace conference—the spirit of conciliation, rationality, understanding, and, in general, the

temper for realism, discussion, concessions, and compromises.

5. Because of haste, turmoil, and hatred, the Conference of 1919 made irreparable mistakes. What is needed this time is a fairly long transition period in which the immediate work of reconstruction and relief may be organized and carried on, in which national governments may be rebuilt, in which passions may cool, and in which the problems of the final peace may be thoroughly studied in advance of the Conference. What is done must be practically related to conditions and feelings in Europe; and, so far as Germany and the occupied countries are concerned, we shall not know until the end of the war what the internal conditions and popular feelings are. Time is needed to get reacquainted with Europe and for Europe to develop new leadership and select its spokesmen.

AGAINST the idea of a "cooling-off" period the arguments below might be presented.

1. The conclusion of peace and the ordering of the world are closely interrelated tasks, just as they were in the Versailles Conference and during the years following it. It is necessary, moreover, that the same general spirit and aim should be brought to both tasks, in order to avoid the fundamental contradictions that characterized the Versailles Treaty. To do the two things at the same time does not require that they be done by the same men. Postwar reconstruction and relief should be handled by one organization; the political problems of peace by another.

2. If both tasks should be postponed for three years

after the armistice, the state of war as a legal fact would continue during this period. We should be in a condition, not of peace, but of suspended hostilities. In this country, the President's war powers would presumably be in full effect. The extraordinary authority that has been delegated to him "for the duration" could hardly be withdrawn. It would not be easy to eliminate the war bureaucracy and the war controls. Foreign commerce and investment would be hampered by uncertainty; and, in general, the situation would favor the continuance and extension of governmental controls over trade and investment, and the inauguration of a world-wide public-works program financed by the United States.

The internal politics of the United States and of other countries would be greatly and needlessly complicated. In this country, during the period of waiting, we would elect a new Congress, possibly two new Congresses and a new President. To the administration that happened to be in power at the end of the war, the postponement would be politically advantageous, for that party would have available the argument of indispensability. Even more important than the revival of such an argument would be the effect of political campaigns on the foreign policy of this country. Plans for world order, becoming partisan issues, might be distorted beyond all hope of world acceptance. Yet we could not expect any real democratic referendum on an international question. When the war is over, our elections will in all likelihood turn on domestic issues, as in the past.

3. The damage may be as great if we conclude peace

but postpone the matter of world order. For this latter problem can be solved only when conditions and thinking are fluid and when men are in the mood to accept change. At the end of this war, Europe will be in an extraordinarily plastic condition; and it would be a fatal error to encourage European peoples to "freeze" politically and psychologically through the rebuilding of their national governments and the creation by such governments of new nationalistic policies, commitments, and vested interests.

4. It may be admitted that the Versailles Conference suffered from haste; but could haste have been avoided? Statesmen of the time felt that, in view of Communism in Russia and the spirit of revolution elsewhere, the need of action was urgent, lest the situation get entirely out of hand. The Peace Conference worked "under a perfectly enormous pressure from all sides to complete its task."² It was considered necessary, as it will be after this war, to guarantee the peace; and, as Woodrow Wilson said, "peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought." As a whole, the situation may be just as urgent at the end of this war as it was in 1918-19.

Without any deliberate policy of postponement and with every effort to make haste, the winding up of a world war takes time; and time invites the unexpected. It took four months to draw up the Treaty of Versailles. It was signed on June 28, 1919, seven and one-half months after the armistice. After the First World War, all of the new nations immediately organized armies

² D. H. Miller, *The Geneva Protocol*, (1925), p. 99.

and did things before the peace conference began that could not later be undone.

5. Waging of war does not preclude preparation for peace. The latter, to be sure, takes time; but time is likely to be sufficient unless government and people are encouraged to be dilatory by talk of postponement. Decisions regarding the principles of peace are essential elements of the strategy of war. Failure to recognize this fact may prolong the struggle and further complicate the peace. Postwar reconstruction policies should also be co-ordinated with peace principles.

These facts are perfectly well known. It is commonly said nowadays that the future world order is being "forged" during the war. In other words, governments are now deciding questions similar to those that would be discussed in the final peace conference. It is said, too, that we shall give further shape to the future world order during the postwar period of reconstruction. If such statements mean anything, we are not postponing this problem and do not intend to postpone it.

The objections, such as they are, to a comprehensive settlement immediately after the war can be removed by: (1) undelayed and thorough preparation for the conference during the war; (2) education and crystallization of public opinion by wise leadership; (3) inter-Allied agreement during the war on peace aims and the broad essentials of the postwar settlement; and (4) in the final settlement itself provision for a flexible organization and for peaceful change.

6. With respect to public feeling, time does permit the passions of belligerents to cool; but also, unfor-

tunately, the feelings of allies tend to become less cordial after the common danger has passed and with it the sense of mutual dependence and the necessity of cooperation. War creates among people a growing feeling of revulsion against itself. Satiated with excitement, anxiety, and horror, people come to feel that no price is too high to pay for peace. The most favorable time, therefore, to crystallize opinion on the question of world order would seem to be during the war; and the best time, apparently, to win popular approval for a comprehensive settlement is immediately after the war. "There is a tide in the affairs of men."

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